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ABSTRACT 
Information Leakage and Sharing in Decentralized Systems 
by 
LUO Huajiang 
Doctor of Philosophy 
This thesis presents two essays that explore firms’ incentive to share information in a 
multi-period decentralized supply chain and between competing firms. 
 
In the first essay, we consider a two-period supply chain in which one manufacturer 
supplies to a retailer. The retailer possesses some private demand information about 
the uncertain demand and decides whether to share the information with manufacturer. 
If an information sharing agreement is achieved, the retailer will share the observed 
demand information truthfully to the manufacturer. Then the selling season with two 
periods starts. In each period, the manufacturer decides on a wholesale price, which 
the retailer considers when deciding on the retail price. The manufacturer can observe 
the retailer's period-1 decision and the realized period-1 demand, and use this 
information when making the period-2 wholesale price decision. Thus, without 
information sharing, the two firms play a two-period signaling game. We find that 
voluntary information sharing is not possible because it benefits the manufacturer but 
hurts the retailer. However, different from one-period model, in which no information 
sharing can be achieved even with side payment, the manufacturer can make a side 
payment to the retailer to induce information sharing when the demand range is small. 
Both firms benefit from more accurate information regardless whether the retailer 
shares information. We also extend the two-period model to three-period model and 
infinite-period model, we find that the above results are robust. 
 
The second essay studies the incentives for information sharing between two 
competing firms with different production timing strategies. Each firm is planning to 
produce a new (upgraded) product. One firm adopts routine timing, whereby her 
production time is fixed according to her tradition of similar or previous models of the 
product. The other firm uses strategic timing, whereby his production time can be 
strategically chosen: be it before, simultaneously with, and after the routine firm. The 
two firms simultaneously choose whether or not to disclose their private demand 
information, make their quantity decisions based on any demand information available, 
and then compete in the market. We find that when the demand uncertainty is not high, 
both firms sharing information is the unique equilibrium outcome. Exactly one firm 
(the routine firm) sharing information can arise in equilibrium when the demand 
uncertainty is intermediate. These results are in stark contrast to extant literature which 
has shown that, for Cournot competitors with substitutable goods, no firm is willing to 
share demand information. Production timing is thus identified as a key driving force 
for horizontal information sharing, which might have been overlooked before. 
Surprisingly, when the competition becomes more intense, firms are more willing to 
share information. It is the information asymmetry that fundamentally change the 
strategic firm’s timing. We highlight the impact of signaling demand information for 
 
 
 
an early-production firm on the timing strategies, under different information sharing 
arrangements. 
 
Keywords: Information Sharing, Information Leakage, Signaling, Inference Effect, 
First-mover Advantage, Production Timing 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Information plays a critically important role in the operations of a business and it allows a
business to make informed and timely decisions. With the rapid development of information
technology, firms can acquire rich data about the future market demand. One question needs
to be asked about the use of the demand information, whether a firm has incentives to share
his private information with other firms, such as its competitors or supply chain partners. This
is related to the topic of information sharing. A firm’s information sharing decision depends on
whether he can benefit from the information sharing. If he benefits from sharing information
with other firm, he has incentives to share. Otherwise, he does not share. In this thesis, we
study two problems related to this information sharing: (1) retailer information sharing in
a multi-period decentralized supply chain, (2) information sharing between competitors with
endogenous timing in production.
1.1 Information Leakage and Sharing in a Multi-Period
Decentralized Supply Chain
In this problem, we study the retailer’s incentive to share information with the manufacturer
in a two-period supply chain. In the literature, some papers study the issue of information
sharing in a supply chain with one manufacturer selling to multiple retailers. They show that
information sharing strengthens the double marginalization effect, which harms the retailer and
benefits the manufacturer. Thus the retailers do not share information with the manufacturer.
However, we find that the retailers may share their information with the manufacturer in
practice. According to Keifer (2010), (1) Capgemini investigated 16 retailers from 11 countries
in Europe and North America in 2007, and finds that 40% of the retailers shared POS (point-
of-sales) data with their upstream firms; and (2) Forrester Research conducted a similar survey
of 89 retailers and 80 consumer products manufacturers and showed that 27% of the retailers
shared POS data. GMA Retailer Direct Data Report 2009 shows that around 25 large retailers
share information with their suppliers and some retailers charge subscription fees for their data.
The previous research cannot fully explain the information sharing practices in industry. In
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this research, we will examine whether multi-period repeated firm interaction is an important
driver of retailers’ incentives to share and to acquire information and whether it can possibly
explain the observed practices.
To address this problem, we consider a decentralized supply chain with one manufacturer
selling to one retailer over two periods. The market demand is uncertain and the retailer can
observe some information about the demand due to more frequent customer interactions. The
retailer can decide whether to share the demand information with the manufacturer before the
selling season. In each selling season, the manufacturer decides on the wholesale price and
then the retailer decides on the retail quantity. If the retailer’s information is shared to the
manufacturer, as shown in the literature, the double marginalization effect hurts the retailer.
If no information is shared, the retailer’s information can be leaked to (or inferred by) the
manufacturer via his quantity decision. We call it inference effect and the inference effect hurts
the retailer. Therefore, the retailer’s information sharing decision depends on the strength of
the double marginalization effect of information sharing and the inference effect.
We fully characterize the retailer’s equilibrium information sharing decision and show that
the demand uncertainty plays an important role in retailer’s information sharing decision. The
manufacturer is always better off with information sharing, but the retailer is always worse off
with information sharing because double marginalization effect of information sharing domi-
nates the inference effect. Consequently, the retailer does not share the information with the
manufacturer voluntarily. However, if the retailer can charge a side payment for sharing infor-
mation with the manufacturer, the retailer has an incentive to share information if and only if
the demand uncertainty is smaller than a threshold, which is different from result in one period
model, that no information sharing agreement can be achieved even with side payment. The
multi-period interaction between the manufacturer and the retailer may explain the retailer’s
information sharing practice in the industry.
1.2 Information Sharing Between Competitors with En-
dogenous Timing in Production
In the second essay, we study the incentives for information sharing between two competing
firms with different production timing strategies. Demand information is important for a firm
when deciding the production timing. A firm can gain first-mover advantage to preempt the
market by investing a large quantity. However, the deep demand uncertainty endows the late
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production strategy a special advantage: gaining useful information from the competitors. We
are curious how the information affects a firm’s production timing. With private information,
whether a firm has incentives to share information with his competitor. In the literature
(Clarke, 1983; Vives 1984 and Li, 1985), no information sharing is the unique equilibrium
between competing firms in Cournot competition. Besides, disclosing private information to
a rival firm is usually considered as a collusive behavior, hurting consumer surplus. However,
these results may reverse if the firms can decide on the production timing.
To model this problem, we develop a stylized model in which two competing firms engage
in Cournot competition. The two firms (one strategic firm and one routine firm) commits a
time for mass production. The routine firm adopts the routine timing, whereby her production
time is fixed. The strategic firm strategically chooses his mass production timing. The two
firms first decide whether to disclose their private information simultaneously, then strategic
firm decides his production timing. At last, the two firms decide their respective production
quantities based on the committed timing.
We fully characterize the equilibrium and find some interesting results. A firm’s production
timing can change firms’ information sharing strategy. Both firms voluntarily sharing informa-
tion can be reached when the demand uncertainty is not large and the early-production firm
can better occupy the market than a late-production firm. However, the first-mover advantage
gets weak without information sharing, because the early-production firm needs to reduce the
production quantity to signal the late-production firm an unfavorable market. These results
are in stark contrast to extant literature, which shows that no information sharing is the unique
equilibrium in Cournot competition.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we study retailer’s incentives
to share information with the manufacturer. In Chapter 3, we explore a firms’ incentives to
share information with his competitor taking the production timing into consideration.
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Chapter 2
Information Leakage and Sharing in a Multi-Period Decen-
tralized Supply Chain
2.1 Introduction
The importance of information to a firm is apparent in economic environment and information
society, especially for firms which sell products in market with uncertain environment. Today,
the increasing opportunities for customer interactions and the fast development of information
technology enable the retailers to acquire rich market data (such as the Point of Sales data)
about the future product demand. Armed with better consumer demand information, the
retailers can decide their sales promotions and sales strategies more wisely to maximize their
profit. One important questions need to be asked about the use of such downstream demand
information. Should retailers share such data with their supply chain partners? According to
Keifer (2010), (1) Capgemini investigated 16 retailers from 11 countries in Europe and North
America in 2007, and finds that 40% of the retailers shared POS (point-of-sales) data with
their upstream firms; and (2) Forrester Research conducted a similar survey of 89 retailers and
80 consumer products manufacturers and showed that 27% of the retailers shared POS data.
GMA Retailer Direct Data Report 20091 shows that around 25 large retailers share information
with their suppliers and some retailers charge subscription fees for their data.
The literature has examined the above questions in a supply chain with one manufacturer
selling to multiple retailers. They demonstrated that information sharing strengthens the dou-
ble marginalization effect, which harms the retailer and benefits the manufacturer. Thus the
retailers have no incentives to share information with the manufacturer. If the manufacturer’s
production cost in linear, information share always hurts the supply chain profit. Hence, even
if the retailer can charge side payment for information sharing, they show that the retailer still
has no incentive to share information with the manufacturer. However, these results cannot
fully explain the information sharing practice in reality that some retailer shares their pri-
vate demand information with the manufacturer. In the literature, some scholars study the
single-period model because they believe that the single-period model is a simplification of
1https://www.gmaonline.org/downloads/research-and-reports/WP-Retailer-DDR09-6.pdf
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multi-period model. Hoever, whether the single-period model misses some important driving
force of of retailers’ incentives to share information with the manufacturer. In this research, we
will examine whether multi-period repeated firm interaction is an important driver of retail-
ers’ incentives to share demand information and whether it can possibly explain the observed
practices.
The multi-period model is different from the single-period model in two places. First,
demand is correlated across selling periods. Demand correlation is common in reality. Longbow
Research says that an analysis of IPhone supply-chain shows a good historical correlation with
subsequent iPhone sales.2 Due to the demand correlation, many softwares are developed to
forecast the demand for next generation product such as ERP, SAP. Demand correlation is also
widely studied in the literautre (Aviv 2002, Gaur et al. 2005, Chen and Lee 2009, Ren et al.
2010). The second difference is multi-period repeated firm interaction. In single-period model,
the manufacturer cannot observe the retailer past decisions. However, in multi-period model,
the manufacturer knows the retailer’s past decisions, which are made based on his private
demand information. Thus, the manufacturer will try to infer the retailer’s private information
and make decision based on the inferred information. This is called inference effect in the
literature.
We consider a two-period decentralized supply chain with one manufacturer selling to one
retailer. The demand is uncertain and the retailer can observe some private information before
the selling season due to more frequent customer interaction. The retailer can decide whether
to share his information with the manufacturer. In each period, the manufacturer decides on
a wholesale price, which the retailer considers when deciding on the retail price. If demand
information is shared between the manufacturer and the retailer, then there is no information
asymmetry between the two firms and both firms make decisions based on same information.
However, as shown in the literature, the double marginalization effect hurts the retailer. With-
out information sharing, the manufacturer can observe the retailer’s period-1 decision, and will
try to infer the retailer’s private information and use the inferred information when making the
period-2 wholesale pricing decision. This is called inference effect in the literature (Li 2002).
Knowing the manufacturer’s inference, the retailer will take the manufacturer’ inference into
consideration when he decides his decision. Due to the inference effect, the retailer may need to
downward distort his quantity to signal an unfavourable market condition to the manufacturer.
The downward distortion due to inference effect hurts the retailer and supply chain. The infer-
ence effect hurts the retailer. The benefits of sharing information depend on the strength of the
2https://9to5mac.com/2017/09/12/iphone-x-8-sales-forecast/ last accessed 26 Jul, 2018.
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double marginalization effect of information sharing and the inference effect. It is unclear which
effect dominates. We will also study how the demand correlation affects the firms’ profits. We
extend our two-period model to three periods and infinite-period to study how the number of
periods affects the above results. To sum up, we have following research questions.
• How does the inference effect affect firms’ decisions?
• Whether the retailer has incentives to share information with the manufacturer?
• How does the demand correlation affect firms’ decisions and expected profits?
• How does the number of periods affect the above results?
Our analysis demonstrates that the demand uncertainty plays an important role in retailer’s
information sharing decision. The multi-period interaction between the manufacturer and the
retailer may explain the retailer’s information sharing practice in the industry. Without in-
formation sharing, if the demand uncertainty is small, due to the inference effect the retailer
who observes a low demand signal has to lower its sales quantity to signal unfavorable market
condition to the manufacturer, which hurts the retailer but benefits the manufacturer. With
information sharing, the manufacturer charges a higher wholesale price (on average) than that
without information sharing, which hurts the retailer. Information sharing always benefits the
manufacturer due to stronger double marginalization effect, but hurts the retailer because dou-
ble marginalization effect of information sharing dominates the inference effect. Consequently,
the retailer does not share the information with the manufacturer voluntarily. When the retailer
can charge a side payment for sharing information with the manufacturer, the retailer has an
incentive to share information if and only if the demand uncertainty is smaller than a thresh-
old. This is true because when the demand uncertainty is low, double marginalization effect of
information sharing is insignificant and dominated by the effect of distortion in retailer’s order
quantity. Our results are in sharp contrast to those in existing literature which claim there is
always no information sharing without or with a side payment under linear production cost.
We
We also extend our two-period model to three-period and infinite-period settings. We find
that our results in two-period model remain intact. The retailer still has no incentive to share
information with the manufacturer voluntarily, but will do when it can charge a side payment
for sharing information and the demand uncertainty is low. As the number of periods increases,
the inference effect become more significantly and the retailer is more likely to share inforamtion
with the manufacturer with side payment.
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2.2 Literature Review
There are three streams of literature that are relevant to this paper, information leakage,
information sharing, and information coordination in multi-period model.
2.2.1 Information Leakage
The first line of the literature related to our work is information leakage. Gal-or (1987) considers
a leader-follower game, in which the two firms engage in Cournot competition. She points out
that information leakage may lead to a first-mover disadvantage as a follower can obtain more
accurate demand information by observing the leader’s decision. Lee and Whang (2000) give
examples of information leakage in supply chain, in which a supplier supplies a critical part
to two manufacturers competing in the final product market. Either the manufacturer would
not share information with the supplier unless it guaranteed that the information is not leaked
to the other manufacturer. However, the shared information may be leaked via the observable
action that the supplier reacts to the information. Li (2002) studies a channel structure with
one manufacturer selling to competing retailers. He identifies two effects of information: a direct
effect caused by changes in strategy by the parties involved in sharing the information and the
indirect effect (or inference effect), in which uninformed parties can infer information from the
observable action of informed parties. Li and Zhang (2008) study the issue of confidentiality of
information when there is inference effect under the same channel structure. They point out
that, due to information leakage, demand information transmitted from a certain retailer to the
manufacturer is leaked to, or inferred by, other retailers through the wholesale price, which is
a function of the shared information. Anand and Goyal (2009) use signaling game to study the
effect of information leakage affects on information and material flows in a supply chain with one
supplier supplying two competing firms. The informed firm’s order information is always leaked
to the uninformed one via their common supplier. The informed firm incurs operational losses
through material flow distortion when he controls the information flow. Information leakage
hurts the informed firm and may result in a less efficient supply chain with potentially lower
profits for all parties. Kong et al. (2013) and Chen and özer (2018) study supply chain contracts
to mitigate or prevent information leakage in supply chains. Kong et al. (2013) consider similar
model to Anand and Goyal (2009) and show that revenue sharing contracts can mitigate the
manufacturer’s incentive to leak the informed retailer’s order information to the uninformed
one. Chen and özer (2018) categorize four types of supply chain contracts which can be used
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to prevent information leakage in a supply chain with one supplier and two retailers.
None of these papers have discussed how information leakage affects supply chain members’
decisions in a multi-period setup, which is the focus of this project.
2.2.2 Information Sharing
Our paper is related to the literature on information sharing. This line of the literature studies
a firm’s incentive to share private information with other firm. In economics, Novshek and
Sonnenschein’s (1982) study of the issue of information sharing in a Cournot duopoly model is
followed by Clarke (1983), Vives (1984), Gal-Or (1985), Li (1985), Shapiro (1986) and Raith
(1996). This body of research studies whether a firm has an incentive to share private informa-
tion horizontally with its competitors in an oligopoly. It is well known that whether a firm is
willing to reveal its private information depends on whether the products are complements or
substitutes, the type of competition (either Cournot competition or Betrand competition) and
the kind of uncertainty (cost or demand).
In the operations management field, research has focused on information sharing in a supply
chain with one manufacturer selling to several competing retailers (Li 2002, Zhang 2002, Li and
Zhang 2008, Jain, Seshadri et al. 2011, Anand and Goyal 2009). Several papers consider infor-
mation sharing in one-to-one supply chain and study issues such as value of information sharing
(Lee et al. 2000, Gaur et al. 2005, Raghunathan 2001), signalling unverifiable information (Ca-
chon and Lariviere 2001), dual distribution channels (Yue and Liu 2006), bilateral information
sharing (Mishra et al. 2009) and risk aversion (Jiang et al. 2016). Leng and Parlar (2009)
study allocation of cost saving in a three-level supply chain with demand information sharing.
Guo et al. (2014), Ha and Tong (2008), Ha et al. (2011), Ha et al. (2017) and Shamir and Shin
(2016a) study information sharing in two competing supply chains. Zhang (2006) examines the
issue of sharing inventory information among suppliers who produce different components for
a manufacturer in a two-echelon assembly system. Özer et al. (2011) consider the role of trust
in information sharing between a supplier and a manufacturer. Zhao et al. (2014) study the
issue of information sharing in outsourcing. Kurtulus et. al. (2012) examine the conditions
under which a supplier and a retailer have incentives to combine their information to form a
shared demand forecast. Shang et al. (2016) discuss retailer’s incentive to share information
in a supply chain with a common retailer. They demonstrate that the retailer may have an
incentive to share information under a nonlinear production cost condition when information
sharing leads to a lower production cost.
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In most of the above studies, there is no information leakage when the a firm does not share
information. The only exceptions are the works of Li and Zhang (2008) and Jiang et al. (2016).
Li and Zhang (2008) study retailer’s information sharing in a supply chain with one manufac-
turer selling to multiple retailers. In their paper, a retailer who agrees to share information
with a manufacturer will leak the information to other retailers who do not share information,
through the wholesale price of the manufacturer. Jiang et al. (2016) study manufacturer’s in-
formation sharing in a distribution channel in which one manufacturer sells to one retailer. The
retailer can infer the manufacturer’s private information from the wholesale price. Different
from the existing literature, we consider a one-to-one supply chain and the information leakage
occurs when a rival observes the past decisions of the informed firm.
2.2.3 Information and Coordination in Multi-Period Model
Previous research in this field has focused on the value of demand information in coordination,
when the demands in different periods are correlated. Barnes-Schuster et al. (2002) establish
sufficient conditions to achieve channel coordination by using a two-period model. Lee and Lim
(2005) consider multi-period models with multiple return levels, and show that their method
leads to less risk and a higher than expected profit. Linh and Hong (2009) study channel coordi-
nation with a revenue-sharing contract for a two-period newsboy problem. These papers focus
more on supply chain coordination. Zhang and Zenios (2008) study the long-term contracts to
induce truthful state revelation in multiperiod principal-agent model with information asym-
metry. Ren et al. (2010) identify a review strategy inducing the truthful-information sharing
in a multi-period model.
In our project, we will focus on a decentralized supply chain and will examine the retailer’s
incentive to share information.
2.3 Model Setup
We consider a supply chain with one manufacturer (she) selling to one retailer (he). We use
subscriptsM and R to denote the manufacturer and the retailer, respectively. The manufacturer
incurs a constant production cost and the retailer incurs a constant selling cost, which are
normalized to zero without loss of generality. The whole selling season has two selling periods,
and firms sell one generation of the product in each selling period. In selling period t, t = 1, 2,
the inverse demand function is
pt = At − qt,
9
where pt and qt are respectively the market clearance retail price and retail quantity in period
t, and At is the random demand intercept. A0 is the information generated from past consumer
interaction. For ease of exposition, we assume that demands are stationary over selling periods,
i.e., A1 and A2 follow the same distribution. We can show that most qualitative results remain
intact when demands are non-stationary, though the expressions become more complicated.
Specifically, we assume that At follows the same distribution as A0, which takes a high value
H with probability α, where α ∈ (0, 1), and a low value L (< H) with probability 1− α. The
assumption of binary demand is widely used in the information sharing literature (Ha and Tong
2008, Anand and Goyal 2009, Kong et al. 2013). Define φ = HL , the parameter φ captures the
demand uncertainty. The distribution of A0 is common knowledge in the market.
Demand across periods are correlated, and hence the sales information for an older gener-
ation of the product can be used to forecast the demand for a newer generation. A0 is the
information generated from past sales activity. In general, the joint probability of At and At+1
(t = 0, 1) is given by
At+1 = H At+1 = L
At = H βα (1− β)α
At = L (1− β)α 1− (2− β)α
It is reasonable to assume that:
A1. Pr (At+1 = H|At = H) ≥ Pr (At+1 = H) for t = 0, 1;
A2. Pr (At+1 = L|At = L) ≥ Pr (At+1 = L) for t = 0, 1.
We can show that the above two assumptions are equivalent to each other. Further-
more, each of them is equivalent to β ≥ α, which is assumed in the remainder of the pa-
per. β can be used to capture the demand correlation. Note that Pr (At+1 = H|At = H) =
β and Pr (At+1 = L|At = L) = 1−2α+αβ(1−α) . If β goes to 1, both Pr (At+1 = H|At = H) and
Pr (At+1 = L|At = L) go to 1. If β approaches α, Pr (At+1 = H|At = H) → α and Pr (At+1 = L|At = L) →
(1− α). Thus, if demand correlation is higher, the past sales information is more accurate
to forecast the demand for next generation product. We assume that the demand infor-
mation is memoryless. Thus only the latest information is useful in demand forecast, i.e.,
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Pr (At+1|At, ..., A0) = Pr (At+1|At). We further define
μ = E [An] = αH + (1− α)L;
μH1 = E [An+1|An = H] = βH + (1− β)L;
μL1 = E [An+1|An = L] = α (1− β)
(1− α) H +
1− 2α+ αβ
(1− α) L;
μH2 = E [An+2|An = H] =
(
α+
(β − α)2
1− α
)
H +
(1− β) (1 + β − 2α)
1− α L;
μL2 = E [An+2|An = L] = α (1− β) (1 + β − 2α)
(α− 1)2 H +
(
1− α (1− β) (1 + β − 2α)
(α− 1)2
)
L;
PHH = Pr (An+1 = H|An = H) = β;
PLH = Pr (An+1 = H|An = L) = α (1− β)
(1− α) .
We consider the following sequence of events:
1. Before the selling season starts, the retailer decides whether or not to disclose information
to the manufacturer.
2. The retailer observes demand information A0 and discloses it to the manufacturer if they
have agreed to do so.
3. The selling season starts. At the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer announces
period-1 wholesale price w1; The retailer orders q1 units from the manufacturer; Order is
completed and delivered to the retailer; Random A1 is realized, products are sold, and
firms collect their respective profits.
4. At the beginning of period 2, the retailer shares A1 to the manufacturer if they have
agreed to do so.
5. The manufacturer announces period-2 wholesale price w2; The retailer orders q2 units
from the manufacturer; The manufacturer produces and deliver the order the the retailer;
A2 is realized and firms collect their respective profits.
We consider ex-ante information sharing, i.e., information sharing decision is made before
collecting demand information. This assumption is realistic because information sharing is a
long-term decision while wholesale price contracting is on a short-term basis. If firms sign
information sharing agreement, they need to invest huge resources in advance in IT infras-
tructure, such as EDI, to enable sharing POS data. It is well known that POS data can be
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used to generate more accurate demand forecasting than aggregate sales data. Sharing demand
information is equivalent to sharing POS data in our paper because firms can use standard
techniques to convert POS data into useful demand information. Information sharing, if such
an agreement has been reached, is truthful, because once the system to share POS data is in
place, transaction-based POS data is shared with the manufacturer in a timely manner. With
information sharing, both firms have a common set of information in making their respective
decisions. If the retailer does not share demand information with the manufacturer, in period 1,
the manufacturer only knows the prior distribution of the demand, based on which he decides
the wholesale price. The retailer makes the quantity decision based on his private information
taking the manufacturer’s rational inference into account. In period 2, after observing the re-
tailer period-1 order quantity which depends on his private information A1, the manufacturer
tries to infer the retailer period-1 information from the order quantity to decide w2. Thus the
two firms are involved in a two-period signaling game.
Backward induction is used to solve the two-period game models. For each information
sharing arrangement, we solve the equilibrium wholesale prices and sales quantities in the
two periods. Based on these, we compute firms’ ex-ante profits, which are used to find the
equilibrium information sharing arrangement.
2.4 Benchmark Model: Single-Period Model
First, we consider a single-period model to study the retailer’s incentive to share information
with the manufacturer. The model setup is same as the main model except that there is only
one selling period. If the retailer shares information with the manufacturer, both firms use the
same information to make decisions. Solving the game, we obtain that the equilibrium wholesale
price is wSB = 12E [A|A0] and the equilibrium retail quantity is qSB = 14E [A|A0], where the
superscript ”B” means Benchmark and ”S” means Share. To avoid boundary solutions and to
ensure that both the manufacturer and the retailer will trade in the market, we assume that
φ ≤ 1 + 13β . If φ > 1 + 13β , the retailer who observes a low demand will not participate in the
game because the wholesale price is so high that he cannot earn positive profit. Firms’ ex ante
profits are
ΠSBM =
1
8
(
αμ2H1 + (1− α)μ2L1
)
;
ΠSBR =
1
16
(
αμ2H1 + (1− α)μ2L1
)
.
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The profit of the supply chain is ΠSBM +Π
SB
R . If no information is shared, given the wholesale
price w, the retailer maximizes his expected profit E [(A− q − w) q|A0] by setting qNB (w) =
1
2 (E [A|A0]− w). Because the manufacturer only knows the prior distribution of demand,
she maximizes her profit E
[
wqNB (w)
]
by setting the wholesale price to μ2 . Therefore, firms’
equilibrium decisions are wNB = μ2 and q
NB = 12
(
E [A|A0]− μ2
)
. Firms’ ex ante profits are
ΠNBM =
1
8
μ2;
ΠNBR =
1
4
(
α
(
μH1 − 1
2
μ
)2
+ (1− α)
(
μL1 − 1
2
μ
)2)
.
The profit of the supply chain is ΠNBM +Π
NB
R .
Lemma 2.1 (a) If the retailer does not share information with the manufacturer, the man-
ufacturer’s decision and profit are independent of the demand correlation. (b) The retailer is
always better off with higher demand correlation.
If no information is shared, the manufacturer decides her wholesale price based on the prior
information, so her wholesale price and profit is independent of the retailer’s information and
the demand correlation. As to the retailer, he can make more accurate decision if the demand
correlation is high, so he benefits from higher demand correlation. Comparing the wholesale
price, retail quantity and ex ante profits under different information sharing status, we can find
the following results.
Lemma 2.2 Suppose there is only one selling period. (a) Information sharing benefits the
manufacturer, but hurts the retailer and the whole supply. (b) The retailer has no incentive to
voluntarily share his private information. (c) There is no information sharing in equilibrium
even if the retailer can share information by charging a side payment from the manufacturer.
If there is no information sharing, the manufacturer makes wholesale price decision only
based on the prior distribution of the demand. However, if the retailer shares information, the
manufacturer responds to demand information when setting her wholesale price. Information
sharing makes the wholesale price responsible to demand information, i.e., wholesale price is
high when demand is high, and is low when demand is low. This makes the double marginaliza-
tion effect more significant, which benefits the manufacturer and harms the retailer. Thus the
retailer will not share information with the manufacturer voluntarily. When the retailer can
charge a side payment for sharing information, he shares information with the manufacturer
only when the supply chain is better off with information sharing. Note that more signifi-
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cant double marginalization also hurts the supply chain, there is no information sharing in
equilibrium even with side payment for sharing information.
2.5 Two-Period Model
Based on whether the retailer shares information with the manufacturer, there are two scenarios:
with information sharing and no information sharing.
2.5.1 With Information Sharing
If the retailer shares information with the manufacturer, the manufacturer and the retailer
have access to a common set of demand information. This is a standard game with complete
information. In period t ∈ {1, 2}, given the wholesale price wt, the retailer maximizes his
period-t expected profit
E
[
πStR|At−1
]
= E [(At − qt − wt) qt|At−1]
with the retail quantity
qSt (wt) =
1
2
(E [At|At−1]− wt) . (2.1)
In anticipation of the retailer’s best response, the manufacturer maximizes
E
[
πStM |At−1
]
= E
[
wtq
S
t (wt) |At−1
]
.
Her optimal wholesale price is
wSt =
1
2
E [At|At−1] . (2.2)
Substituting (2.2) into (2.1), we obtain the retailer’s equilibrium retail quantity as in Lemma
2.3.
Lemma 2.3 If the retailer shares information with the manufacturer, the equilibrium wholesale
price and retail quantity in period t ∈ {1, 2} are
wSt =
1
2
E [At|At−1] ,
qSt =
1
4
E [At|At−1] .
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Firms’ ex ante profits are
ΠSM =
1
4
(
αμ2H1 + (1− α)μ2L1
)
, (2.3)
ΠSR =
1
8
(
αμ2H1 + (1− α)μ2L1
)
. (2.4)
The supply chain profit is
ΠSM +Π
S
R =
3
8
(
αμ2H1 + (1− α)μ2L1
)
.
2.5.2 No Information Sharing
If the retailer does not disclose his private information with the manufacturer, firms’ available
information when making decisions in each period is shown in the following table.
Period 1 Period 2
The manufacturer - qN1
The retailer A0 A0, A1
In period 1, the manufacturer only knows the prior distribution of demand; in period 2, she
observes the retailer period-1 order quantity qN1 , and tries to infer the retailer period-1 private
information in deciding her period-2 wholesale price. In anticipation of the manufacturer’s
inference, the retailer decides his retail quantity either based on his information or independent
of his information. These two cases correspond to the separating equilibrium and pooling
equilibrium of perfect Bayesian game, respectively. According to Gibbon (1992) and Mas-
Colnell et al. (1995), a set of strategies and belief system is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE) if following conditions are satisfied.
(a) The manufacturer’s belief PrM
(
A0 = H|qN1 (A0)
)
is derived from the retailer’s decision
using Bayes’ rule;
(b) The manufacturer’s wholesale price is optimal given the retailer’s retail quantity qN1 (A0)
and her belief PrM
(
A0 = H|qN1 (A0)
)
.
(c) The retailer’s order quantity qN1 (A0) is optimal given the manufacturer’s wholesale price
wN2 ;
We first use the above definition to solve the signaling game for separating equilibrium and
pooling equilibrium. Then we use the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) to refine the
equilibria.
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Separating Equilibrium
In separating equilibrium, the retailer makes quantity decision based on his private informa-
tion, that is, he sets a high/low retail quantity if the information shows that the demand is
high/low. We first study how the manufacturer infers the retailer’s private information. Then
we analyze how the retailer conveys his information via his order quantity in anticipation of
the manufacturer’s inference. Finally we study how the inference effect affects firms’ decisions
and profits.
Period-2 Problem Given the wholesale price w2, the retailer maximizes
E
[
πN2R|qN1 , A0, A1
]
= E [(A2 − q2 − w2) q2|A0, A1]
by choosing the retail quantity
qN2 (w2) =
1
2
(E [A2|A1]− w2) . (2.5)
The manufacturer observes qN1 . She knows that the retailer would choose a high retail quantity
if the demand signal is high (A0 = H), and a low retail quantity otherwise. If the manufacturer
chooses to infer the retailer’s private information, she holds the following belief
P̃rM
(
A0 = H|qN1 (A0)
)
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 0 if q1 ≤ q̃
N
1L,
1 if q1 > q̃
N
1L.
(2.6)
That is, if she observes an order quantity (weakly) lower than q̃N∗1L , she believes that the retailer
period-1 private signal is low (A0 = L); otherwise, she believes that A0 = H. The manufacturer
maximizes
E
[
πN2M |qN1
]
= E
[
wN2 q
N
2 (w2) |qN1
]
=
1
2
wN2
(
E
[
A2|qN1
]− wN2 )
by setting the wholesale price to
w̃N2
(
qN1
)
=
1
2
E
[
A2|qN1
]
. (2.7)
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Plugging (2.7) into (2.5), we obtain q̃N2 =
1
2
(
E [A2|A1]− 12E [A2|A0]
)
. Therefore, firms’ profits
in the second period are
E
[
π̃N2M |qN1
]
=
1
8
(
E
[
A2|qN1
])2
,
E
[
π̃N2R|qN1 , A0, A1
]
=
1
4
(
E [A2|A1]− 1
2
E
[
A2|qN1
])2
.
So the two firms period-2 equilibrium ex ante profits are E
[
π̃N2M
]
= 18
(
μ2H2α+ μ
2
L2 (1− α)
)
and
E
[
π̃N2R
]
= 14
((
μH1 − 12μH2
)2
PHH +
(
μL1 − 12μH2
)2
(1− PHH)
)
α + 14 (
(
μH1 − 12μL2
)2
PLH +(
μL1 − 12μL2
)2
(1− PLH)) (1− α). If the manufacturer does not infer the retailer’s private
information, the equilibrium wholesale price is ẅN2 =
1
2μ and the equilibrium retail quantity is
q̈N2 =
1
2
(
E [A2|A1]− 12μ
)
. The manufacturer’s and the retailer’s period-2 ex ante profits are
E
[
π̈N2M
]
= 18μ
2 and E
[
π̈N2R
]
= 14
(
μH1 − 12μ
)2
α+ 14
(
μL1 − 12μ
)2
(1− α), respectively.
Lemma 2.4 (a) The manufacturer always prefers to infer the retailer’s private information.
(b) The retailer period-2 profit is lower with the inference effect. That is, E
[
π̃N2R
]
< E
[
π̈N2R
]
.
By inferring the retailer’s private information, the manufacturer can decide her wholesale
price in response to the demand information and thus benefit. Hence she always infers the
retailer’s information. Though the inferred information is not as accurate as the retailer’s latest
information, it makes the double marginalization more significant, which hurts the retailer.
Period-1 Problem Observing the manufacturer’s wholesale price wN1 , in anticipation of the
manufacturer’s rational inference in the second period, the retailer decides his retail quantity to
convey his private information. Because the retailer’s decision will affect his profit is the second
period, for a given wholesale price wN1 , the high-type retailer (we call the retailer is high-type
retailer if A0 = H) maximizes his long-term profit
E
[
πNR
(
qN1H
) |A0 = H] = E [πN1R (qN1H) |A0 = H]+ E [πN2R (qN1H) |A0 = H] , (2.8)
subject to
E
[
πNR
(
qN1L
) |A0 = L] ≥ E [πNR (qN1H) |A0 = L] , (2.9)
qN1H ≥ 0, (2.10)
where qN1H/q
N
1L means that the retailer decides a high/low retail quantity, E[π
N
1R
(
qN1H
) |A0 =
H] =
(
μH1 − qN1H − wN1
)
qN1H and E
[
πN2R
(
qN1H
) |A0 = H] is the expected profit in the second
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period if A0 = H. E
[
πN2R
(
qN1H
) |A0 = H] = E [πN2R|qN1H , A0 = H,A1 = H]Pr(A1 = H|A0 =
H) + E
[
πN2R|qN1H , A0 = H,A1 = L
]
Pr(A1 = L|A0 = H). Similarly the low-type retailer maxi-
mizes
E
[
πNR
(
qN1L
) |A0 = L] = E [πN1R (qN1L) |A0 = L]+ E [πN2R (qN1L) |A0 = L] , (2.11)
subject to
E
[
πNR
(
qN1H
) |A0 = H] ≥ E [πNR (qN1L) |A0 = H] , (2.12)
qN1L ≥ 0, (2.13)
Inequalities (2.10) and (2.13) are retailer’s participation constraints, ensuring the retailer to
participate and earn non-negative profit. The left hand side of the inequalities (2.9) and (2.12)
are the high-type/low-type retailer’s on-equilibrium profits and the right hand side of the in-
equalities (2.9) and (2.12) are the high-type/low-type retailer’s off-equilibrium profits. The
inequalities (2.9) and (2.12) are the incentive compatibility constraints to make sure that each
type of the retailer has no incentive to mimic the other and to mislead the manufacturer
about the demand type. That is, the retailer’s on-equilibrium profits are no less than the
off-equilibrium profits.
After solving the problem (see appendix for details), we obtain for a given wholesale price
w̃N1 , the retailer’s best response is
q̃N1H
(
wN1
)
=
1
2
(
μH1 − wN1
)
, if A0 = H,
q̃N1L
(
wN1
)
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2
(
μL1 − wN1
)
, if A0 = L and φ ≥ φ̃,
1
2
(
μH1 − wN1 − 12
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
)
, if A0 = L and φ < φ̃,
where φ̃ = 1 + 2(α−1)
2
(5−4β)α2+2(3β+β2−5)α+(4−3β2) . When the information indicates the demand is
low (A0 = L), the retailer’s unconstrained maximum of his profit is
1
2
(
μL1 − wN1
)
. He will not
choose a high retail quantity to mislead the retailer because a high retail quantity leads to lower
retail price and profit margin. In addition, the manufacturer believes A0 = H and charges a
high period-2 wholesale price, which hurts the retailer in the long run. Hence the retailer will
charge a low price and the high-type retailer is ex post efficient. The high-type retailer may
decide a low retail quantity to induce a low period-2 wholesale price. Consequently, the retailer
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earns more profit in the second period. When φ is greater than φ̃, the additional profit earned
in the second period cannot cover the loss in the first period due to significant loss of sales.
Hence, the high-type has no incentives to mimic the low-type. When H is close to L (φ is
smaller than φ̃), if qN1L
(
wN1
)
= 12
(
μL1 − wN1
)
, the high-type retailer can earn more profit by
setting a low retail quantity. To separate out from the high-type retailer, the low-type retailer
has to decide a quantity lower than 12
(
μL1 − wN1
)
.
In the first period, because the manufacturer period-1 decision does not affect her period-2
profit, she only needs to maximize her period-1 profit. Therefore, the problem for the manu-
facturer in period 1 is to maximize
E
[
πN1M
]
= wN1 E
[
qN1
(
wN1
)]
, (2.14)
where E
[
qN1
(
wN1
)]
= qN1H
(
wN1
)
α+ qN1L
(
wN1
)
(1− α). Substituting the retailer’s best response
in to (2.14), we obtain the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price. The separating equilibrium
for the two-period signaling game is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 The separating Perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists and is as follows:
The manufacturer’s period-1 wholesale price is
w̃N1 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2μ, if φ ≥ φ̃,
1
2μH1 − 14 (1− α)
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2), if φ < φ̃.
The retailer’s period-1 retail quantity is
q̃N1H =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2
(
μH1 − 12μ
)
, if φ ≥ φ̃ and A0 = H,
1
4
(
μH1 +
1
2 (1− α)
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
)
, if φ < φ̃ and A0 = H,
q̃N1L =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2
(
μL1 − 12μ
)
, if φ ≥ φ̃ and A0 = L,
1
4
(
μH1 − 12 (1 + α)
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
)
, if φ < φ̃ and A0 = L,
The manufacturer’s period-2 wholesale price is
w̃N2H =
1
2
μH2 if P̃rM (A0 = H) = 1,
w̃N2L =
1
2
μL2 if P̃rM (A0 = H) = 0,
consistent with her belief
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P̃rM
(
A0 = H|qN1 (A0)
)
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 0, if q1 ≤ q̃
N
1L,
1, if q1 > q̃
N
1L.
The retailer’s period-2 retail quantity is
q̃N2 (A0 = A1 = H) =
1
2
(
μH1 − 1
2
μH2
)
,
q̃N2 (A0 = A1 = L) =
1
2
(
μL1 − 1
2
μL2
)
,
q̃N2 (A0 = H,A1 = L) =
1
2
(
μL1 − 1
2
μH2
)
,
q̃N2 (A0 = L,A1 = H) =
1
2
(
μH1 − 1
2
μL2
)
.
The manufacturer’s expected profit is
E
[
π̃NM
]
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
8μ
2 + 18μ
2
H2α+
1
8μ
2
L2 (1− α), if φ ≥ φ̃,(
μH1− 12 (1−α)
√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)
)2
+μ2H2α+μ
2
L2(1−α)
8 , if φ < φ̃.
The retailer’s expected profit is
E
[
π̃NR (A0 = H)
]
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(μH1− 12μ)
2
+(μH1− 12μH2)
2
PHH+(μL1− 12μH2)
2
(1−PHH)
4 , if φ ≥ φ̃,⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
(
μH1+
1
2 (1−α)
√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)
)2
16
+
(μH1− 12μH2)
2
PHH+(μL1− 12μH2)
2
(1−PHH)
4
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭, if φ < φ̃,
E
[
π̃NR (A0 = L)
]
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(μL1− 12μ)
2
+(μH1− 12μL2)
2
PLH+(μL1− 12μL2)
2
(1−PLH)
4 , if φ ≥ φ̃,⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(
μL1− 34μH1+ 18 (3−α)
√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)
)
4
∗
(
μH1 − (α+1)
√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)
2
)
+
(μH1− 12μL2)
2
PLH+(μL1− 12μL2)
2
(1−PLH)
4
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
, if φ < φ̃.
To better understand the influence of the inference effect on firms’ decisions, we compare
the above results with that in single-period period. Recall that the retailer has incentives to
convince the manufacturer that the demand is low. When φ is sufficiently large, the cost for the
high-type retailer is too high to mimic the low-type retailer, so the high and low demand states
are naturally separated. However, when φ < φ̃, due to the inference effect, the low-type retailer
has to set the quantity lower than his first-best level 12
(
μL1 − 12μ
)
. For the manufacturer, on the
one hand, due to the inference effect, she succeeds in inferring the retailer’s private information
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and makes wholesale price decision based on the inferred information. Hence, the inference
effect increases the manufacturer period-2 profit. On the other hand, if φ < φ̃, the low-type
retailer has to reduce his order quantity from the first-best level to signal his information, which
in turn decreases the manufacturer’s period-1 profit.
Pooling Equilibrium
In pooling equilibrium, regardless of the observed information, the retailer sets same order
quantity. Because the retail quantity is independent of the demand information, the manufac-
turer cannot infer the retailer period-1 information from the order quantity and she will decide
the wholesale price using the prior distribution of the demand.
Period-2 Problem Given the wholesale price wN2 , the retailer maximizes
E
[
πN2R|qN1 , A0, A1
]
= E
[(
A2 − qN2 − wN2
)
qN2 |A0, A1
]
,
by choosing the retail quantity
qN2
(
wN2
)
=
1
2
(
E [A2|A1]− wN2
)
.
The manufacturer observes qN1 . Similar to Guo and Jiang (2014) and Jiang et al. (2015), we
construct the belief system as
P̂rM
(
A0 = H|qN1 (A0)
)
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ α if q
N
1 ≤ q̂N1 ,
1 if qN1 > q̂
N
1 .
In period 2, if the manufacturer observes a quantity lower than q̂N1 , then her belief is same as
the prior belief. If qN1 > q̂
N
1 , she believes A0 = H. The manufacturer maximizes
E
[
πN2M |qN1
]
=
1
2
wN2
(
E
[
A2|qN1
]− wN2 ) ,
by setting her wholesale price to
ŵN2
(
qN1
)
=
1
2
E
[
A2|qN1
]
.
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Firms’ period-2 profits are
E
[
π̂N2M |qN1
]
=
1
8
(
E
[
A2|qN1
])2
,
E
[
π̂N2R|qN1 , A0, A1
]
=
1
4
(
E [A2|A1]− 1
2
E
[
A2|qN1
])2
.
Period-1 Problem Given wN1 and the manufacturer’s belief system, there exists a pooling
perfect Bayesian equilibrium if and only if the following constraints are satisfied
max
qN1
E
[
πNR
(
qN1 ≤ q̂N1
) |A0 = H] = E [πNR (qN1 = q̂N1 ) |A0 = H] (2.15)
max
qN1
E
[
πNR
(
qN1 ≤ q̂N1
) |A0 = L] = E [πNR (qN1 = q̂N1 ) |A0 = L] (2.16)
E
[
πNR
(
q̂N1
) |A0 = H] ≥ E [πNR (qN1 > q̂N1 ) |A0 = H] , (2.17)
E
[
πNR
(
q̂N1
) |A0 = L] ≥ E [πNR (qN1 > q̂N1 ) |A0 = L] , (2.18)
qN1 ≥ 0 (2.19)
E
[
πNR
(
qN1 ≤ q̂N1
) |A0] represents the retailer long-term expected profit if qN1 ≤ q̂N1 . Other
inequalities are similar for other situations. Constraint (2.19) is the participation constraint
and ensures both types of the retailer to participate. Constraints (2.17) and (2.18) are the
incentive compatibility constraints for the pooling equilibrium. Constraint (2.17) ensures the
high-type retailer would like pool the quantity rather than reveal his type by setting a high
quantity. Constraint (2.18) ensures the low-type retailer would like pool the quantity rather
than mimic the high type. Solving the game (see the appendix for detail), we can get that
given the wholesale price, the retailer’s best response is
q̂N1
(
wN1
)
=
1
2
(
μL1 − wN1
)
.
The manufacturer period-1 decision does not affect her period-2 profit, so she only needs to
maximize her period-1 profit. Taking the retailer’s best response into consideration, the man-
ufacturer maximizes
E
[
πN1M
]
= wN1 E
[
q̂N1
(
wN1
)]
by setting her wholesale price to
ŵN1 =
1
2
μL1.
Proposition 2.2 The Pooling Perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists if and only if φ < 1 +
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2(1−α)2
α3−7α2β+2α2+4αβ2+6αβ−7α−4β2+5β and is as follows:
The manufacturer’s period-1 wholesale price is
ŵN1 =
1
2
μL1.
The retailer’s period-1 retail quantity is
q̂N1 =
1
4
μL1.
The manufacturer’s period-2 wholesale price is
ŵN2 =
1
2
μ,
which is consistent with her belief
P̂rM
(
A0 = H|qN1 (A0)
)
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ α if q
N
1 ≤ q̂N1 ,
1 if qN1 > q̂
N
1 .
The retailer’s period-2 retail quantity is
q̂N2 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2
(
μH1 − 12μ
)
if A1 = H,
1
2
(
μL1 − 12μ
)
if A1 = L.
Firms’ expected profits are
E
[
π̂NM
]
=
1
8
(
μ2L1 + μ
2
)
,
E
[
π̂N2R|A0 = H
]
=
μL1 (4μH1 − 3μL1)
16
+
(
μH1 − 12μ
)2
PHH
4
+
(
μL1 − 12μ
)2
(1− PHH)
4
,
E
[
π̂N2R|A0 = L
]
=
1
16
μ2L1 +
1
4
(
μH1 − 1
2
μ
)2
PLH +
1
4
(
μL1 − 1
2
μ
)2
(1− PLH) .
Equilibrium Refinement
We note that both the separating and pooling equilibria may exist, which equilibrium will be
selected? In the literature (Anand and Goyal, 2009, Beer et al. 2017, Li et al. 2014, Tang et al.
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2018), the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) is widely used to refine the equilibrium
of signaling game. We use the Intuitive Criterion to refine the equilibria and get the following
results.
Proposition 2.3 (a) The separating equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion.
(b) The pooling equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion.
In the separating equilibrium, no firms deviate from the equilibrium. However, in the pooling
equilibrium, the high-type retailer will not set a sufficiently small retail quantity even though
the manufacturer believes that such a small retail quantity is from the low-type retailer. The
low-type retailer benefits from such deviation if he is considered as low-type. So the pooling
equilibrium does not survive the Intuitive Criterion. In the following part of this chapter, we
will focus on the separating equilibrium.
Firms’ Ex Ante Profits
Because only the separating equilibrium satisfies the Intuitive Criterion, we only discuss firms’
ex ante profits of separating equilibrium, which are
ΠNM =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
8
(
μ2 + μ2H2α+ μ
2
L2 (1− α)
)
, if φ ≥ φ̃,(
μH1− (1−α)2
√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)
)2
+μ2H2α+μ
2
L2(1−α)
8 , if φ < φ̃,
(2.20)
ΠNR =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
4
(
2μ2H1α+ 2μ
2
L1 (1− α)− 34μ2 − 34μ2H2α− 34μ2L2 (1− α)
)
, if φ ≥ φ̃,⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(8α−3)
16 μ
2
H1 +
1
4 (1− α)μL1 (μH1 + μL1)
+ 3(α+1)(α−3)64 μ
2
H2 +
(1−α)(α+3)
16 μH2μL2 +
(α+15)(α−1)
64 μ
2
L2
+
(2α+3)(1−α)μH1−2(1−α2)μL1
16
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭ , if φ < φ̃.
(2.21)
Lemma 2.5 If the retailer does not share information with the manufacturer, both firms’ ex
ante profits are increasing in the demand correlation β.
For the retailer, a high demand correlation can help him make a better quantity decision,
so he can make more profit. For the manufacturer, she makes rational inference about the
retailer’s private information and decides her period-2 wholesale price based on the inferred
information. Though the accuracy of the inferred information is less accurate than that of
the retailer period-2 information, she still benefits from the inferred information. The higher
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demand correlation is, the more accurate the inferred information is. Since both firms’ profits
are increasing in β, so the supply chain’s profit is also increasing in β.
2.5.3 Equilibrium Information Sharing Decision
Now we compare the two scenarios to study how the information sharing agreement affects
firms’ ex ante profits. If the retailer shares information, firms’ ex ante profits are represented
in (2.3) and (2.4). Otherwise, their ex ante profits when the retailer does not share information
are provided in (2.20) and (2.21). Comparing firms’ ex ante profits in the two scenarios, we
obtain the following results.
Proposition 2.4 In two-period model, (a) Information sharing always benefits the manufac-
turer, but hurts the retailer.
(b) The retailer has no incentive to share information with the manufacturer voluntarily.
From Lemma 2.3, we can find that if the demand information is shared, the manufacturer
will adjust her equilibrium wholesale price response to the demand information positively. If
the information shows the demand is low, the manufacturer will adjust her wholesale price
downward, which benefits both the manufacturer and the retailer. However, when demand is
high, she will adjust her wholesale price upward and charge a high price. This strength the
strong double marginalization, which benefits the manufacturer but hurts the retailer greatly.
The double marginalization of information sharing also hurts the supply chain. If the retailer
does not share information, we can find that due to the inference effect, the retailer’s period-1
quantity is downward distorted from the first-best level if he observes a low demand, which
hurts the low-type retailer. we can find that the manufacturer’s period-2 decision positively
responds to the inferred information and the inference effect benefits the manufacturer period-
2 profit. Though the inference effect benefits the manufacturer, she can gain more profits
from the strong double marginalizationof information sharing and prefer information sharing.
In contrast, the retailer suffers from information sharing, so he has no incentive to share his
private information with the manufacturer voluntarily with the manufacturer. The double
marginalization of information sharing dominates the inference effect. Now suppose the retailer
can charge the manufacturer a side payment for informaiton sharing, the retailer’s incentive to
share information with the manufacturer is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5 Suppose the retailer can charge a side payment for sharing information, there
exists a threshold φ2 ∈
(
1, φ̃
)
such that information sharing agreement can be achieved with
side payment if and only if φ ≤ φ2.
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Figure 2.1: Information Sharing with Side Payment (Two Periods)
If φ is sufficiently large (φ > φ2), the information sharing makes the double marginaliza-
tion much stronger, which hurts both the retailer and the supply chain. The manufacturer’s
additional gain (ΠSM − ΠNM ) is less than the retailer’s loss (ΠNR − ΠSR), so information sharing
agreement cannot be achieved even with side payment. When H is close to L (φ ≤ φ2), to
signal his information, the low-type retailer has to lower the period-1 order quantity from the
first-best level, which in turn hurts the manufacturer period-1 expected profit. The inference
effect hurts the manufacturer and she can gain much more profit from information sharing. And
the manufacturer’s additional profit can cover the the retailer’s loss, so the retailer can charge
the manufacturer a side payment
(
ΠSM −ΠNM
)
for information sharing. Let α = 13 , Figure 2.1
shows the retailer’s information sharing decision with side payment.
2.6 The Impact of Number of Periods on Information
Sharing
In this part, we extend the two-period model to three-period model and infinite-period model
to study whether the results in two-period model still hold and how the number of periods
affects the retailer’s information sharing decision.
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2.6.1 Three-Period Model
With Information Sharing If information is shared, then both firms make their respective
decision based on the same information and the equilibrium decisions in period t are
wS3t =
1
2
E [At|At−1] ,
qS3t =
1
4
E [At|At−1] .
Firms’ ex ante profits are
ΠS3M =
3
8
(
αμ2H1 + (1− α)μ2L1
)
,
ΠS3R =
3
16
(
αμ2H1 + (1− α)μ2L1
)
.
To distinguish from the two-period model, we use ”S3” to denote ”information sharing in
three-period model”.
No Information Sharing If the retailer does not share information, in period t = 2, 3,
the manufacturer will infer the retailer’s private information from the quantity. So there are
two signaling games in the three-period model. After solving the game, the equilibrium are
summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.6 If there are three selling periods and the retailer does not share information
with the manufacturer, the Separating Perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the game is as follows:
(a) If φ ≥ φ̃, the retailer’s quantity in period 1 is
qN31 (A0 = H) =
1
2
(
μH1 − 1
2
μ
)
,
qN31 (A0 = L) =
1
2
(
μL1 − 1
2
μ
)
,
the retailer’s quantity in period t = {2, 3} is
qN3t (At−2 = H,At−1 = H) =
1
2
(
μH1 − 1
2
μH2
)
;
qN3t (At−2 = H,At−1 = L) =
1
2
(
μL1 − 1
2
μH2
)
;
qN3t (At−2 = L,At−1 = H) =
1
2
(
μH1 − 1
2
μL2
)
;
qN3t (At−2 = L,At−1 = L) =
1
2
(
μL1 − 1
2
μL2
)
;
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if φ < φ̃, the retailer’s quantities are
qN31 (A0 = H) =
1
2
(
1
2
μH1 +
√
Δ1 (1− α)
)
;
qN31 (A0 = L) =
1
4
μH1 − 1
2
(α+ 1)
√
Δ1;
qN32 (At−2 = H,At−1 = H) =
1
4
(
μH1 +
(1− PHH)
2
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
)
;
qN32 (At−2 = L,At−1 = H) =
1
4
(
μH1 +
(1− PLH)
2
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
)
;
qN32 (At−2 = H,At−1 = L) =
1
4
(
μH1 − (PHH + 1)
2
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
)
;
qN32 (At−2 = L,At−1 = L) =
1
4
(
μH1 − (PLH + 1)
2
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
)
;
qN33 (A1 = H,A2 = H) =
1
2
(
μH1 − 1
2
μH2
)
;
qN33 (A1 = H,A2 = L) =
1
2
(
μL1 − 1
2
μH2
)
;
qN33 (A1 = L,A2 = H) =
1
2
(
μH1 − 1
2
μL2
)
;
qN33 (A1 = L,A2 = L) =
1
2
(
μL1 − 1
2
μL2
)
;
where Δ1 =
(PHH−PLH)
(
8μH2−4μH1−
√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)(PHH+PLH−2)
)√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)
64 .
(b) If φ ≥ φ̃, the manufacturer’s wholesale price in period 1 is wN1 = 12μ, in period t = {2, 3} is
wN32 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2μH2 if q1 > q
N3
1 (A0 = L) ,
1
2μL2 otherwise,
wN33 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2μH2 if q2 > q
N3
2 (A0 = s,A1 = L) ,
1
2μL2 otherwise,
if φ < φ̃, the manufacturer’s wholesale price in period 1 is wN31 =
1
2μH1 −
√
Δ1 (1− α),
wN32 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
(
1
2μH1 − 14 (1− PHH)
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
)
if q1 > q
N3
1 (A0 = L) ,
1
2μH1 − 14 (1− PLH)
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2) otherwise,
wN33 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2μH2 if q2 > q
N3
2 (A0 = s,A1 = L) ,
1
2μL2 otherwise,
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which is consistent with her belief
PrM (A0 = H) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 0 if q1 ≤ q
N3
1 (A0 = L) ,
1 if q1 > q
N3
1 (A0 = L) ,
PrM (A1 = H) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 0 if q2 ≤ q
N3
2 (A0 = s,A1 = L) ,
1 if q2 > q
N3
2 (A0 = s,A1 = L) ,
where s = {H,L}.
Lemma 2.6 If there are three selling periods, regardless of retailer’s information sharing deci-
sion, both the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profits are increasing in the demand correlation.
We can find the result is same as Lemma 2.5. For the retailer, he is always better off
with high demand correlation, because he can make his quantity decision more wisely. As to
the manufacturer, if information is shared, it is intuitive that she benefits from high demand
correlation. If no information is shared, she can use the inferred information to decide her
period-2 wholesale price and a high demand correlation results in more accurate information,
which benefits her period-2 profit.
Proposition 2.7 In three-period model,
(a) the manufacturer is better off with information sharing, but the retailer is worse off with
information sharing.
(b) the retailer has no incentive to share information with the manufacturer voluntarily.
In three-period model, we can find that the double marginalization still dominates the
inference effect and voluntary information sharing cannot be achieved. Figure 2.2 shows the
retailer’s information sharing decision with side payment. We can see that there is a threshold
φ3 such that if φ > φ3, the inference effect is weak. But information sharing intensifies the
double marginalization effect and hurts the retailer and the supply chain, so the retailer will
not share information with the manufacturer even if he can charge a side payment. However, if
φ ≤ φ3, the inference effect becomes strong and dominates the double marginalization. So the
supply chain’s profit with information sharing is higher than that without information sharing
and information sharing can be achieved with side payment, which the retailer charges the
manufacturer.
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Figure 2.2: Information Sharing with Side Payment (Three Periods)
2.6.2 Infinite-Period Model
If there are infinite selling periods, in each period, the problems for the manufacturer and the
retailer are same. If the retailer shares information, both firms decide their respective decision
based on the shared information and their decisions only affect their current profits. If the
retailer does not share information with the manufacturer, since the retailer’s current decision
only affects the profits in current period and next period, so he only needs to maximize the
total expected profits of the two periods. And the manufacturer only needs to maximize her
profit in current period because her wholesale price decision only affects her profit in current
period. So firms’ decisions follow stationary decision policy in each period. In other words,
if the information available to the manufacturer (or the retailer) in period t is same as that
in other period, then the wholesale prices (or the retail quantities) between the two periods
are same. That is, qNIt (At−2 = s,At−1 = H) = Q
NI
sH , q
NI
t (At−2 = s,At−1 = L) = Q
NI
sL and
wNIt (At−2 = s) = W
NI
s , where the the superscript ’NI’ means no information sharing in
infinite-period model and s = {H,L}. Thus, we only need to analyze the game in period t.
We use ’NI’ and ’SI’ to denote with information sharing and without information sharing in
infinite-period model.
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With Information Sharing If the retailer shares information with the manufacturer, in
period t, given the wholesale price wSt , the retailer maximizes
E
[
πSItR |At−1
]
= E
[(
At − qSIt − wSIt
)
qSIt |At−1
]
by setting qSIt
(
wSIt
)
= 12
(
E [At|At−1]− wSIt
)
. Knowing the retailer’s best response, the man-
ufacturer maximizes
E
[
πSItM |At−1
]
= E
[
wSIt q
SI
t |At−1
]
,
by choosing wSIt =
1
2E [At|At−1]. Firms’ ex ante profits in period t are
ΠSIM =
1
8
(
μ2H1α+ μ
2
L1 (1− α)
)
,
ΠSIR =
1
16
(
μ2H1α+ μ
2
L1 (1− α)
)
.
No Information Sharing If the retailer does not share information with the manufacturer,
the manufacturer will try to infer the retailer’s via the observed order quantity. We assume the
manufacturer’s belief is
PrM
(
An−2 = H|qNIm for m ≤ n
)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
if qNIn−1 > q
NI
n−1 (An−3 = s,An−2 = L)
and PrM
(
An−3 = s|qNIm for m ≤ n− 1
)
= 1,
0
if qNIn−1 ≤ qNIn−1 (An−3 = s,An−2 = L)
and PrM
(
An−3 = s|qNIm for m ≤ n− 1
)
= 1.
Given the wholesale price wNt and the manufacturer’s belief, the high-type retailer maximizes
E
[
πNItR
(
QNIsH
) |At−2 = s,At−1 = H]+ E [πNI(t+1)R (QNIsH) |At−2 = s,At−1 = H] (2.22)
subject to
E
[
πNtR
(
QNIsL
) |At−1 = L,At−2 = s]+ E [πNItR (QNIsL ) |At−1 = L,At−2 = s]
≥ E [πNItR (QNIsH) |At−1 = L,At−2 = s]+ E [πNI(t+1)R (QNIsH) |At−1 = L,At−2 = s] , (2.23)
QNIsH ≥ 0, (2.24)
where s = {H,L}. The low-type retailer maximizes
E
[
πNItR
(
QNIsL
) |At−1 = L,At−2 = s]+ E [πNI(t+1)R (QNIsL ) |At−1 = L,At−2 = s] (2.25)
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subject to
E
[
πNtR
(
QNIsH
) |At−1 = H,At−2 = s]+ E [πNI(t+1)R (QNIsH) |At−1 = H,At−2 = s] ,
≥ E [πNItR (QNIsL ) |At−1 = H,At−2 = s]+ E [πNI(t+1)R (QNIsL ) |At−1 = H,At−2 = s] ,
(2.26)
QNIsL ≥ 0. (2.27)
Constraints (2.23) and (2.26) are the incentive compatibility constraints and constraints (2.24)
and (2.27) are the participation constraints. Solving the game (see the appendix for detail), we
can get that the high-type retailer sets his retail quantity to
QNIsH
(
WNIs
)
=
1
2
(
μH1 −WNIs
)
,
and the low-type retailer sets his retail quantity to
QNIsL
(
WNIs
)
=
1
2
(
μL1 −WNIs
)
,
if 14 (μH1 − μL1)2 − 14
(
WNIH −WNIL
) (
2μL1 (1− β) + 2βμH1 −WNIH −WNIL
) ≥ 0 is satisfied.
Otherwise, he sets the retail quantity to
QNIsL
(
WNIs
)
=
1
2
μH1 − 1
2
WNIs −
√
Δs,
where Δs = E[π
NI
(t+1)R
(
QNIsL
) |At−1 = H,At−2 = s] − E[πNI(t+1)R (QNIsH) |At−1 = H,At−2 = s].
In the first stage, In anticipation of the retailer’s best response and the retailer’s order quantity,
the manufacturer maximizes
E
[
πNItM |QNIt−1 (At−2 = s)
]
= WNIs E
[
QNIt |QNIt−1 (At−2 = s)
]
.
Solving the game, we can get the following proposition.
Proposition 2.8 If the selling seasons are infinite and the retailer does not share information
with the manufacturer, the Separating Perfect Bayesian equilibrium for period t is as follows:
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(a) The manufacturer’s wholesale price is
WNIH =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2μH2 if φ ≥ φ̃ and PrM (A0 = H) = 1,
4(1−PHH)Q+μH1PHH+μH1PLH
2PLH+2
if φ < φ̃ and PrM (A0 = H) = 1,
WNIL =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2μL2 if φ ≥ φ̃ and PrM (A0 = H) = 0,
1
PLH+1
(2Q− 2QPLH + μH1PLH) if φ < φ̃ and PrM (A0 = H) = 0,
which is consistent with her belief
Pr
(
At−2 = H|qNIt−1
)
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 1 if q
NI
t−1 > Q
NI
sL ,
0 otherwise.
(b) The retailer’s retail quantity is
QNIHH =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2
(
μH1 − 12μH2
)
if φ ≥ φ̃,
(2μH1−μH1PHH+μH1PLH−4(1−PHH)Q)
4PLH+4
otherwise,
QNILH =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2
(
μH1 − 12μL2
)
if φ ≥ φ̃,
(μH1−2Q+2QPLH)
2PLH+2
otherwise,
QNIHL =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2
(
μL1 − 12μH2
)
if φ ≥ φ̃,
(4Q(1+PHH)−μH1PHH+μH1PLH)
4PLH+4
otherwise,
QNILL =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2
(
μL1 − 12μL2
)
if φ ≥ φ̃,
Q otherwise,
where Q =
μH1(4+PHH(6PLH−4PHHPLH−3PHH+4P 2LH)−3P 2LH)+4μL1(PLH+1)(PHH−1)(PHH−PLH)
−8PHH+8PLH+4P 2HH−4P 2LH+16
.
We can find that the separating equilibrium in Proposition 2.8 is similar to that in Propo-
sition 2.1. If φ ≥ φ̃, the high-type retailer and the low-type retailer naturally separate out.
If φ < φ̃, to prevent the high-type retailer from mimicking the low-type retailer, the low-type
retailer has to lower his retail quantity from his first-best level, which hurts the low-type retailer
and in turn hurts the manufacturer, but benefits the high-type retailer due to the low wholesale
price. Given the firms’ equilibrium decisions in Proposition 2.8, we can calculate firms’ ex ante
profits in period t, which are given by
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ΠNIM =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
8
(
μ2H2α+ μ
2
L2 (1− α)
)
if φ ≥ φ̃,
1
8
(4q(1−PHH)+μH1(PHH+PLH))2
(PLH+1)
2 α+
1
2
(2q(1−PLH)+μH1PLH)2
(PLH+1)
2 (1− α) otherwise.
ΠNIR =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
4
(
μH1 − 12μH2
)2
αβ + 14
(
μH1 − 12μL2
)2
α (1− β)
+ 14
(
μL1 − 12μH2
)2
α (1− β) + (μL1−
1
2μL2)
2
(1−2α+αβ)
4
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ if φ ≥ φ̃,⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(
μH1 − wNIH −QNIHH
)
QNIHHαβ
+
(
μL1 − wNIH −QNIHL
)
QNIHLα (1− β)
+
(
μH1 − wNIL −QNILH
)
QNILHα (1− β)
+
(
μL1 − wNIL −QNILL
)
QNILL (1− 2α+ αβ)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
otherwise.
Lemma 2.7 If there are infinite selling periods, despite retailer’s information sharing decision,
both the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profits are increasing in the demand correlation.
Equilibrium Information Sharing Decision Comparing firms’ and supply chain’s ex ante
profits with and without information sharing, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2.9 If there are infinite selling seasons,
(a) Information sharing always benefits the the manufacturer, but hurts the retailer.
(b) The retailer has no incentive to share information with the manufacturer voluntarily.
(c) There exists a threshold φ∞ ∈
(
0, φ̃
)
such that the retailer can charge the manufacturer
a side payment for information sharing if and only if φ ≤ φ∞.
We can find that the results in two-period model still hold when we extend to infinite-period
model.
2.6.3 The Impact of Number of Periods on Information Sharing
Our previous analysis shows that the voluntary information sharing cannot be achieved but
information sharing agreement can be achieved with side payment if the demand uncertainty
is smaller than a threshold. We define the average one-period supply chain profit as the mean
of supply chain profit in each period. If the retailer shares information with the manufacturer,
the average one-period supply chain profits in the three models are same. If the retailer does
not share information, the average one-period supply chain profit decreases as the number of
periods increases. This is because that when the number of periods is two (three), if the demand
uncertainty is low, the low-type retailer will downward distort his quantity from the first-best
level due to the inference effect in period 1 (period 1 and 2). When the number of periods is
34
infinite, the low-type retailer needs to downward distort his quantity from the first-best level
in each period if the demand uncertainty is low. Hence, as the number of periods increases, the
inference effect becomes more significant if demand uncertainty is low, which hurts the supply
chain deeply. As shown in Figure 2.3, the average one-period supply chain profit difference
between with information sharing and without information sharing increases as the number of
periods increases.
Figure 2.3: Average One-Period Supply Chain Profit Difference
The numerical studies show that φ2 < φ3 < φ∞, that is, as the number of periods increases,
the retailer are more likely to share information with the manufacturer with side payment. Let
L = 1 and a = 13 , φ2, φ3 and φ∞ are shown in Figure 2.4. As the number of periods increases,
the inference effect becomes more significant when the demand uncertainty is low. The supply
chain profit with information sharing is more likely to greater than that without information
sharing. Therefore, the retailer is more likely to share information with the manufacturer with
side payment.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a decentralized supply chain in which one manufacturer sells products
to consumers via a retailer over two periods and study the retailer’s incentive to share demand
information with the manufacturer in multi-period interactions. Before the selling season, the
retailer decides whether to share information with the manufacturer and then reports truthfully
to the manufacturer after he observes the demand information if they achieve an agreement. In
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Figure 2.4: The Impact of Period Length on Information Sharing
each selling period, the manufacturer decides the wholesale price and then the retailer decides
the retail quantity. In single period model, information sharing intensifies the double marginal-
ization effect, which benefits the manufacturer but hurts the retailer, so the retailer will not
share information with the manufacturer even with a side payment. In two-period model, if the
retailer shares information, the double marginalization effect hurts the retailer. If the retailer
does not share information, the manufacturer will try to infer the retailer’s private information
from the order quantity. The inference effect harms the retailer. So the retailer’s incentive to
share demand information with the manufacturer depends on the trade-off between the double
marginalization effect of information sharing and inference effect of no information sharing.
We find that if no information sharing agreement is achieved, the retailer will decide an
convey quantity to signal his information to the manufacturer due to inference effect. The
manufacturer rationally infers the retailer’s private demand information from his order quantity
and decides her period-2 wholesale price based on the inferred information. On one hand,
the manufacturer period-2 information capability is improved due to the inference effect and
the improved information capability benefits the manufacturer but hurts the retailer. On the
other hand, the retailer may need to distort his retail quantity from the first-best level to
signal his information when he observes a low demand, which also harms the retailer. Though
the inference effect hurts the retailer greatly, the double marginalization effect of information
sharing is stronger than the inference effect, and the retailer will not share information with
the manufacturer voluntarily. However, when the demand uncertainty is less than a threshold,
the manufacturer can make a side payment to induce retailer’s information sharing. We also
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find that regardless of information sharing agreement, both the manufacturer and the retailer
benefit from high demand correlation.
We extend our two-period model to three-period model and infinite-period model and find
that the above results are robust. The double marginalization effect still dominates the inference
effect and information sharing cannot be achieved voluntarily. However, information sharing
agreement can be achieved if the demand uncertainty is less than a threshold. As the number of
periods increases, the inference effect becomes more significant. Thus the threshold is increasing
in the number of periods. The retailer is more likely to share demand information with the
manufacturer by charging a side payment.
There are several possible extensions to this study. It may be interesting to extend our
single supply chain model to other supply chain structures, such as competing supply chains, or
competing manufacturers selling to one common retailer. In addition, it also may be interesting
to consider firms operational improvements such as production cost reduction effort. Finally, it
may be interesting to study how the manufacturers nonlinear production cost affects the retailers
incentives to share information in a multi-period model. At last, it may be interesting to explore
how the negative demand correlation affects the retailer’s information sharing decision.
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Chapter 3
Information Sharing Between Competitors with Endoge-
nous Timing in Production
3.1 Introduction
The rapid development of high technologies and the demanding taste of consumers stimulate
frequent product innovation or upgrading, especially in the electronic manufacturing industry.
Firms use diverse strategies in choosing when to produce new/upgraded products. Apple puts
its new iphones onto the market in every mid September. In contrast, Samsung may put onto
the market its new Galaxy Note-series products before (in mid August), or simultaneously with
(in mid September), or after (in mid October) Apple’s iphones for different years. Samsung’s
change in its production timing is not unintentional. It is reported that, in 2015, Samsung
deliberately claimed its release of new smartphone Galaxy Note 5 onto the market in mid
August, a month earlier than its traditional playbook, aiming to woo buyers several weeks
before Apple, its biggest competitor who soon released iphone 6s. Thus the timing of producing
new/upgraded products appeals for a prudent decision, particularly under competition.
Information always plays an important role in the timing of production. Although early pro-
duction enables a firm to enchant consumers and to preempt the market, the deep uncertainty
in the market potential endows the late production strategy a special advantage: gaining useful
information from the competitors. In fact, failure to extract demand information from early
production competitors can lead to unsuccessful operations of a new product. According to the
2012 Q4 financial report of Microsoft, 900 million dollars were used to adjust the inventory of its
newly produced product, Surface RT, reflecting a heavy mismatch between supply and demand.
Beside the technical reasons, the failure of Surface RT operations also attributes to Microsoft’s
negligence in learning the market potential from its competitors. Apple’s new ipad, compet-
ing to but produced three months earlier than Surface RT, had already encountered declining
sales, indicating a non-optimistic market potential in that period. Such a decline of demand in
that segment was corroborated in IDC’s later survey. Information, and its asymmetry among
competing firms, adds a lever in the timing strategies of production.
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It looks information sharing between competitors is hardly possible, by the existing studies.
On one hand, Cournot competitors with substitutable products, do not have incentives to vol-
untarily share their private demand information (Vives 1984). On the other hand, disclosing
private information to a rival firm is usually considered as a collusive behavior, hurting con-
sumer surplus. However, firms may uses different production timing strategies with different
information sharing arrangement, and this in turn may reverse their information incentives.
In this paper, we develop a stylized model to study competing firms’ incentives for infor-
mation sharing with endogenous timing in production. Consider two firms, each of which is
planning to produce a new (upgraded) product. Each firm commits a time for mass production
of the product. The routine firm (she) adopts routine timing, whereby her production time is
fixed according to her tradition of similar or previous models of the product. The strategic firm
(he) uses strategic timing, whereby his production time can be strategically chosen. The two
firms simultaneously choose whether or not to disclose their private information. The strategic
firm determines his timing in production: he chooses to produce before, simultaneously with,
and after the routine firm. The two firms choose their mass production quantities according to
their committed timing in production, based on any available demand information. We attempt
to answer the following research questions: How should the strategic firm time his production
under different information sharing arrangements? How will firms change their incentives for in-
formation sharing when timing in production is endogenous? How are firms’ decisions impacted
by competition intensity?
We find several interesting results. A firm’s strategic timing in production can fundamentally
change over his and his rival’s information sharing strategy. Both firms voluntarily sharing
information can be reached when the demand uncertainty is not large. An early-production
firm’s can better occupy the market than a late-production firm. However, such first mover
advantage is much dampened without sharing information, because the early-production firm
has to reduce his/her output quantity to signal the late-production firm an unfavorable market.
Our result is in sharp contrast to Vives (1984), which shows that with substitutable products,
it involves no pooling of information in Cournot competition. Moreover, we show both firms
sharing information benefits the expected consumer surplus and the expected total surplus.
Exactly one firm (the routine firm) sharing information can arise in equilibrium when the
demand uncertainty is intermediate. A firm’s information sharing strategy depends on his
(her) characteristics in production timing. For a routine firm, making her demand information
public is beneficial in most cases, while for a strategic firm, concealing his information brings
him informational advantage due to his flexibility in production timing. The flexibility of
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production timing can help explain diverse partial information sharing practices. When the
demand uncertainty is appropriately large, no information sharing is the unique equilibrium.
One may expect that with greater competition intensity firms are less willing to share
information, because by concealing information a firm gains informational advantage. However,
our study shows that the more intense the competition, the more likely both-sharing arises as the
equilibrium. This result is driven by the strategic firm’s increased incentive for early production
to occupy the market and to gain first mover advantage, in response to more fierce competition.
The strategic firm uses different timing strategy under different information sharing ar-
rangement. When both firms share their information, the strategic firm always produces ahead
of the routine firm, because early production enables him to make a preemptive and credible
move that gives him a higher market share (first-mover advantage). When only the routine
firm shares her information, the strategic firm always produces simultaneously with the routine
firm. This is in stark contrast to Mailath (1993) who shows that the informed firm always
chooses to set quantity before the uninformed firm. The reason for the two contrasting results
is that in Mailath (1993) the informed firm commits the timing of setting quantity after it
sees the demand signal, whereas in our study the more informed firm (strategic firm) commits
the timing of setting quantity before he observes the demand signal. When only the strategic
firm shares information, late production outperforms other production timing strategies, and
second-mover advantage prevails. When neither firm shares information, the strategic firm
never produces before the routine firm, and he prefers late production if and only if he is not
well informed or the demand uncertainty is large. These results suggest that firms should be
cautious in choosing when to produce under information asymmetry, and being preemptive is
not optimal in most cases. Furthermore, when neither firm shares information, the strategic
firm’s flexibility of production timing may make him worse than the routine firm, even if the
cost for timing flexibility is zero.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section
3 sets up the model. Section 4 analyzes the model. Section 5 discusses several extensions.
Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
Our paper contributes to the literature on horizontal information sharing. Clarke (1983), Vives
(1984), Gal-Or (1985) and Li (1985) explore the incentives for Cournot oligopolists to share
demand information with each other. They find that no information sharing is the unique
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equilibrium if firms produce substitutable goods and compete in quantity. Shamir and Shin
(2016b) study retailers’ incentives to exchange demand information in a trade association with
a common manufacturer. They show that no information sharing is the equilibrium if the
wholesale price is endogenously determined by the manufacturer. Natarajan et al. (2015)
study the ex post information sharing strategies of two competing firms who make information
sharing decisions after they observe the demand signals. They find that ex post information
sharing can arise under certain conditions. This stream of research focuses on the incentives
for horizontal information sharing with firms making operational decisions (price or quantity)
simultaneously. Our paper incorporates firms’ timing for making quantity decisions into the
information sharing problem, and finds that timing can change firms’ incentives for information
sharing.
Some articles examine sequential versus simultaneous move in an oligopoly game by com-
paring the respective profits. Gal-Or (1985) shows that with identical firms, the slopes of the
reaction functions determine whether the leader or follower does better. When reaction func-
tions slope down (e.g. quantity competition with substitutable goods), a leader earns higher
profits than a follower. Dowrick (1986) shows the same results in an asymmetric duopoly model.
Bagwell (1995) and Várdy (2004) show that the leader can be hurt if its choice is imperfectly
observed or if there are observation costs. By taking into account firms’ private information
about the uncertain market demand, Gal-Or (1987) demonstrates that the follower is better
off compared to the leader for a wide range of parameter values. Maggi (1999) shows that the
leader has advantage if it has private information about the cost and the its action is imper-
fectly observed. The papers mentioned above contrast firms’ profitability with timing of moves
still being exogenously given, while we endogenize firms’ timing strategies under information
asymmetry.
The assumption that the order of the moves are exogenously imposed in oligopoly situations
was criticized by von Stackelberg (1934) who points out that the players have preferences
over which role (leader or follower) to play in the game. Following this thought, Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990), van Damme and Hurkens (1999, 2004) study the endogenous timing in
duopoly games where each firm choose one of the two periods to make its price or quantity
decision. They discuss how firms’ timing strategies depend on factors like production cost and
risk dominance. Amir et al. (2006) consider a differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly game
with general demand and asymmetric linear costs, and show that the firm with a sufficiently
large cost has a first-mover advantage. By adding information asymmetry, Mailath (1993) shows
that even when moving first is disadvantageous for the informed firm (who can choose between
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moving in the first or second period), simultaneous move is not an equilibrium that passes the
equilibrium refinement. These studies concentrate on firms’ timing strategies, while the central
interest of our paper is the interaction between firms’ timing and information sharing strategies.
Our paper is related to information leakage issues whereby a firm’s private information may
be inferred by other firms through its actions. Li and Zhang (2008) consider a supply chain
with an upstream manufacturer and multiple downstream retailers; a retailer can infer the rival
retailers’ private information via the manufacturer’s wholesale price. Gal-Or et al. (2008) study
a supply chain with one manufacturer and two retailers where each firm possesses some demand
information, and they show that the manufacturer may prefer to share its information with
the less informed retailer. Anand and Goyal (2009) consider a model with one manufacturer
supplying an incumbent firm and one entrant firm under a wholesale price contract; they find
that the manufacturer always leaks the incumbent’s order quantity to the entrant. Kong et
al. (2013) study a similar model to that in Anand and Goyal (2009) except that the contract
type becomes revenue sharing. They demonstrate that for a set of revenue sharing contracts
a nonleakage equilibrium sustains. Although our paper also considers the signaling effect, the
focus is quite different from the above papers. In all their models, timing of the firms’ pricing or
quantity decisions are exogenously fixed, while our study intends to find the production timing
strategies in a competitive market setting.
3.3 Model Setup
Consider two firms, each of which is planning to produce a new (upgraded) product. Each
firm commits a time for mass production of the product. Firm r (she) adopts routine timing,
whereby her production time is fixed according to her tradition of similar or previous models of
the product. Firm s (he) uses strategic timing, whereby his production time can be strategically
chosen. We call firm r the “routine firm”, and firm s the “strategic firm” hereafter.
We focus on the three possibilities of production timing of the strategic firm: Ts = E, C,
and L means that he commits to produce earlier than , concurrently with, and later than the
routine firm, respectively. Imagine Apple as the routine firm who puts its new iphones onto
the market in every mid September; imagine Samsung as the strategic firm who may put onto
the market its new Galaxy Note-series products before (in mid August), or simultaneously with
(in mid September), or after (in mid October) Apple’s iphones for different years.1 We assume
1The time when a product is put into the market is an approximator for the time for mass production,
because the time difference between the two is a constant production lead time. For example, in the smartphone
industry, the time for mass production is a couple of weeks (production lead time) ahead of time-to-market.
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that firm s incurs a fixed cost C to gain the flexibility in the timing for mass production. For
example, he invests in advanced production technologies or in storing enough key components
beforehand, so that his product can be manufactured in time even if he has committed an
earlier production.
The two products are differentiated but substitutable, and hence the two firms compete
in the end market. Each firm determines her/his mass production quantity.2 The demand is
uncertain, and the inverse demand function for firm i (i = r, s) is given by
pi = a+ θ − qi − βqj , (3.1)
where pi is the retail price of product i, a is the average market potential, θ is a zero-mean
random variable with variance σ2, qi is the production quantity of firm i, and β ∈ (0, 1) is
the substitutability of the two products and hence represents the competition intensity. A
larger β means greater competition intensity. To isolate the impact of information on firms’
production timing strategies, we assume the operations costs of both firms are zero. Relaxing
this assumption to constant operations costs does not change our results qualitatively.
Each firm i (i = r, s) has access to a demand signal Yi, which is an unbiased estimator of
θ (i.e., E[Yi|θ] = θ). We assume linear-expectation information structure: the expectation of θ
conditional on the signal(s) is a linear function of the signal(s), and the two signals are indepen-
dent conditional on θ. This information structure has been commonly used in the information
sharing literature (e.g. Li 2002, Wu and Zhang 2014, Ha et al. 2017) and includes well-known
prior-posterior conjugate pairs like normal-normal, beta-binomial, and gamma-Poisson. Define
the signal accuracy as ti = σ
2/E[V ar[Yi|θ]] (ti ∈ (0,∞)), and a larger ti means a more accurate
demand signal for firm i. For i = r, s, define
ui =
ti
1 + ti
, vi =
ti
1 + tr + ts
.
It is easy to show (Ericson 1969) that
E[θ|Yi] = uiYi, V ar[Yi] = 1
ui
σ2,
E[E[θ|Yi]]2 = V ar[E[θ|Yi]] = uiσ2,
2The firms determine quantities instead of prices, because we incorporate the timing of production in our
model where the firms may play a sequential game. Quantities can be credibly committed in sequential move
game, while prices can be adjusted. In addition, Singh and Vives (1984) show that for substitutable goods, the
manufacturers would prefer quantity competition to price competition.
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and that
E[θ|Yr, Ys] = vrYr + vsYs,
E[E[θ|Yr, Ys]]2 = (vr + vs)σ2.
For more details of the linear-expectation information structure, refer to Vives (1999, Section
2.7.2). When without confusion, we also interpret ui ∈ (0, 1) as firm i’s information capability
because it is increasing in the signal accuracy.
The two firms may choose to disclose their demand information. Specifically, a firm may join
a trade association that makes the demand information available for both firms (Li 1985 and
Vives 1995). There are a number of such trade associations collecting and aggregating demand-
related data such as sales forecast (e.g. Consumer Technology Association).3 Competing firms
may indeed join the same trade association. For example, Microsoft and Motorola both are
members of Mobile Marketing Association; Samsung, Google, Intel and others are members
of Computer and Communication Industry Association.4 Firms can also disclose information
through common suppliers (Anand and Goyal 2009, Kong et al. 2013). Samsung is the top
supplier, in addition to the competitor of Apple.5
The sequence of events, depicted in Figure 3.1, is as follows:
1. Each firm decides whether or not to share information to a common (third-party) plat-
form, the data on which is available to both firms.
2. The strategic firm decides the timing for mass production Ts ∈ {E,C,L}. That is,
the strategic firm can make his mass production before (first, Ts = E), simultaneously with
(meanwhile, Ts = C), and after (last, Ts = L) the routine firm.
3. Each firm observes a private signal Yi, and transmit it to the trade association if the firm
has committed to sharing information.
4. The two firms determine their mass production quantities according to their timing
strategy. In particular, the routine firm follows her regular schedule to make her quantity
decision qr, and the strategic firm makes his quantity decision qs according to his timing strategy
Ts ∈ {E,C,L}. After that, the demand uncertainty θ is resolved. Firms clear their product on
the market and collect their revenues.
3https://www.cta.tech/Membership.aspx
4http://www.mmaglobal.com/members
http://bgr.com/2017/07/21/apple-vs-qualcomm-samsung-google-microsoft/
5http://www.technologyace.com/mobile/samsung/samsung-will-be-apples-top-supplier-for-iphones-again-in-
2017/
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Figure 3.1: Sequence of Events
The above sequence of events contains three decision-making stages. In the first stage, both
firms simultaneously and separately decide on whether or not to share the demand information.
In the second stage, the strategic firm makes the mass production timing decision. In the
third stage, the two firms determine their output quantities according to their timing for mass
production. Below we make several further explanations for the above sequence.
The two firms’ information sharing decisions are made before the production timing deci-
sions. Information sharing is a long-term decision that involves investment in the infrastructure
necessary to support the information transmission to a trade association. The large fixed cost
for a formal information sharing system is sunk upon establishment, and hence information
sharing arrangement cannot be frequently changed. In contrast, the production timing deci-
sion is medium-term, and can be adjusted for each selling season, say on half-yearly or yearly
bases. The demand information is always truthfully transmitted, and firms cannot manipulate
their data. Joining a trade association requires a firm not to cheat for reputation concerns. In
addition, demand-related data are usually verifiable (e.g. order from retailers, market survey
data, recent shipment volume or sales data, etc.).
The strategic firm’s production timing decision is made before the demand signal is realized.
Timing of mass production requires detailed preparation of production and planning, signing
letters of production intent with manufacturers. In the smartphone industry, production timing
should be committed several months before the product put to market (e.g., CNBC 2016). In
contrast, firms’ demand signals are generated when the selling season is near and when the
demand trend becomes clear. A firm’s commitment to production timing is credible. In fact,
a firm’s the production preparation work, say hiring labors and purchasing key components,
can easily be observed, verified, and often reported by press. For example, it is not realistic for
Samsung to arbitrarily change the time-to-market of its new product due to pressure from the
media and suppliers.
If the strategic firm produces before the routine firm, then his private signal Ys can be
inferred by the routine firm via the production quantity qs. Similarly, if the strategic firm
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produces after the routine firm, then he can infer the signal Yr via qr. Therefore, sequential
production leads to signaling issues such that upon observing the early-production firm’s output
quantity, the late-production firm can infer the former’s demand information. An implicit
assumption here is that the early-production firm’s output quantity is observable to the late-
production firm. This is supported by both theory and practices. Anand and Goyal (2009)
show that, under wholesale price contracts, the upstream suppliers would like to disclose the
order quantity of the early-ordering firm to the late-ordering firm. Kong et al. (2013) confirm
that this is also true in certain circumstances under revenue sharing contracts. In practice,
a common upstream supplier can disclose order information. For example, the suppliers of
Huawei, Oppo and Vivo (three giant Chinese smartphone manufacturers) reveal that the three
companies are cutting smartphone orders by over 10% (Digitimes 2017). Also, some consulting
firms IDC publish and analyze the shipment volume of smartphones every quarter.
3.4 Model Analysis
We solve the game described in Section 3 by backward induction. Let Xi be the information
sharing decision of firm i (i = r, s), where Xi = S if firm i shares information, and Xi = N
otherwise. For each information sharing scenario (Xr, Xs), we find the equilibrium quantities
and the strategic firm’s timing decision. We then study the firms’ equilibrium information
sharing decisions by comparing firms’ expected profits in different scenarios.
3.4.1 Scenario SS, Both Firms Sharing Information
In Scenario SS, both firms share their information (i.e., Xr = Xs = S). Both firms observe two
signals (Yr, Ys) when making the production quantity decisions.
Equilibrium Quantity Decisions in Scenario SS
We analyze the two firms’ production quantities separately for Ts = C, E and L, respectively.
Suppose the strategic firm produces simultaneously with the routine firm, Ts = C. The two
firms simultaneously choose their quantities with symmetric information (Yr, Ys). In particular,
firm i (i = r, s) chooses qi to maximize her/his profit
πSSi (qi;C) = qi · (a+ E[θ|Yr, Ys]− qi − βqj) ,
where the superscript SS indicates Scenario SS, and the subscript i indicates firm i with
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Ts = C. The first order condition with respect to qi as a function of qj is q̂
SS
i (qj ;C) =
1
2 (a+ E[θ|Yr, Ys]− βqj). Simultaneously solving qSSs = q̂SSs (qSSr ;C) and qSSr = q̂SSr (qSSs ;C)
generates the equilibrium output quantity
qSSi (C) =
1
2 + β
(a+ vrYr + vsYs) , (3.2)
where C indicates Ts = C and i = r, s.
Suppose the strategic firm produces before the routine firm, Ts = E. This is a typical
Stackelberg game with symmetric information. Given the strategic firm’s output quantity qs,
the routine firm chooses qr to maximize his profit based on (Yr, Ys)
πSSr (qr; qs, E) = qr · (a+ E[θ|Yr, Ys]− qr − βqs) ,
where the subscript r indicates firm r with Ts = E. This leads to her optimal response function
q̂SSr (qs;E) =
1
2 (a+ E[θ|Yr, Ys]− βqs). Anticipating firm r’s response q̂SSr (qs;E), firm s chooses
qs to maximize his profit based on (Yr, Ys)
πSSs (qs;E) = qs ·
(
a+ E[θ|Yr, Ys]− qs − βq̂SSr (qs;E)
)
.
His optimal output quantity in equilibrium is hence
qSSs (E) =
2− β
2 (2− β2) (a+ vrYr + vsYs) , (3.3)
and firm r’s equilibrium output quantity is
qSSr (E) =
4− 2β − β2
4 (2− β2) (a+ vrYr + vsYs) . (3.4)
Suppose the strategic firm produces after the routine firm, Ts = L. Due to the symmetry of
information, this case mirrors the Ts = E case with indicators r and s swapped. Specifically,
the equilibrium output quantities for the strategic firm and the routine firm are, respectively,
qSSs (L) =
4− 2β − β2
4 (2− β2) (a+ vrYr + vsYs) , (3.5)
and
qSSr (L) =
2− β
2 (2− β2) (a+ vrYr + vsYs) . (3.6)
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The Strategic Firm’s Timing Decision in Scenario SS
For Ts = E, C, and L, we substitute firms’ equilibrium quantities into the strategic firm’s profit
functions, take the expectation over the signals, and then obtain the strategic firm’s expected
profits by producing before, simultaneously with, and after the routine firm in scenario SS
ΠSSs (E) =
(2− β)2
8 (2− β2)
(
a2 + (vr + vs)σ
2
)
,
ΠSSs (C) =
1
(2 + β)
2
(
a2 + (vr + vs)σ
2
)
,
ΠSSs (L) =
(
4− 2β − β2)2
16 (2− β2)2
(
a2 + (vr + vs)σ
2
)
.
Apparently, ΠSSsE > Π
SS
sC > Π
SS
sL , and hence the strategic firm’s optimal timing of production in
Scenario SS is TSSs = E.
Proposition 3.1 If both firms share information, the strategic firm always chooses to produce
before the routine firm (TSSs = E).
In Scenario SS, there is no information asymmetry. By producing earlier than the routine
firm, the strategic firm makes a preemptive and credible move that gives him a higher mar-
ket share (E[qSSs (E)] > E[q
SS
r (E)]). Proposition 3.1 reveals that if the production timing is
the strategic firm’s endogenous decision, he always produces ahead of the routine firm under
information symmetry.
The Value of Flexible Timing in Scenario SS
In Scenario SS, the routine firm’s expected profits when the strategic firm producing before,
simultaneously with, and after her are, respectively,
ΠSSr (E) =
(
4− 2β − β2)2
16 (2− β2)2
(
a2 + (vr + vs)σ
2
)
,
ΠSSr (C) =
1
(2 + β)
2
(
a2 + (vr + vs)σ
2
)
,
ΠSSr (L) =
(2− β)2
8 (2− β2)
(
a2 + (vr + vs)σ
2
)
.
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According to the economics literature, when firms compete in quantity where the reaction
function is downward sloping, the firm moves first outperforms the firm moves second, and the
first mover advantage can be quantified by the difference between the two firms’ equilibrium
profits (e.g. Gal-Or 1985). Similar in spirit, we define the value of flexible timing as the dif-
ference between the two firms’ expected profits in equilibrium: V SS = ΠSSs (E) − ΠSSr (E) =
(4−3β)β3
16(2−β2)2
(
a2 + (vr + vs)σ
2
)
> 0. This benefit tends to disappear when the competition inten-
sity β is low, and hence can be outweighed by the cost of flexible timing C; the benefit is most
significant when the competition intensity β is high. Therefore, without information asymme-
try, the strategic firm is willing to gain flexibility in production timing in a highly competitive
market.
3.4.2 Scenario SN, Only Routine Firm Sharing Information
In Scenario SN, only the routine firm shares information. The routine firm knows Yr and the
strategic firm knows Yr and Ys when making their quantity decisions.
Equilibrium Quantity Decisions in Scenario SN
Similar to scenario SS, we analyze the two firms’ production quantities separately for Ts = C,
E and L.
Suppose the strategic firm produces simultaneously with the routine firm, Ts = C. The two
firms simultaneously choose their quantities based on different information. The strategic firm
chooses qs to maximize his profit based on his signals Yr and Ys
πSNs (qs;C) = qs · (a+ E[θ|Yr, Ys]− qs − βqr) ,
where the superscript SN indicates routine firm sharing information scenario and the subscript
s indicates firm s with Ts = C. The first order condition with respect to qs as a function of qr
is q̂SNs (qr;C) =
1
2 (a + E[θ|Yr, Ys] − βqr). Meanwhile, the routine firm chooses qr to maximize
her profit based on her signal Yr
πSNr (qr;C) = qr · (a+ E[θ|Yr]− qr − βE[qs|Yr]) .
The first order condition with respect to qr as a function of qs is q̂
SN
r (qs;C) =
1
2 (a+E[θ|Yr]−
βE[qs|Yr]). Simultaneously solving qSNs = q̂SNs (qSNr ;C) and qSNr = q̂SNr (qSNs ;C) generates the
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equilibrium output quantity
qSNr (C) =
1
2 + β
(a+ urYr) , (3.7)
and
qSNs (C) =
1
2 + β
a+
1
2
vsYs +
1
2
(
vr − β
2 + β
ur
)
Yr. (3.8)
Suppose the strategic firm produces before the routine firm, Ts = E. When Ts = E, the
strategic firm produces before the routine firm, and hence his production quantity qs conveys
his demand signal Ys that can be inferred by the routine firm. Following Gal-Or (1987), Gal-Or
et al. (2008) and Li and Zhang (2008), we focus on linear form separating equilibrium in which
the routine firm always correctly infers the strategic firm’s demand information. The routine
firm believes qs = f
SN
s (Ys) where f
SN
s (·) is a linear and increasing function.
Given qs, based on her signal Yr and her belief Ys =
(
fSNs
)−1
(qs), the routine firm chooses
qr to maximize her expected profit
πSNr (qr; qs, E) = qr ·
(
a+ E[θ| (fSNs )−1 (qs), Yr]− qr − βqs) .
Hence the routine firm’s best response to qs is q̂
SN
r (qs;E) =
1
2
(
a+ E[θ| (fSNs )−1 (qs), Yr]− βqs).
Knowing the routine firm’s best response and her belief, the strategic firm chooses qs to
maximize his profit based on his own demand signal Ys and the signal Yr shared by the routine
firm
πSNsE (qs;E) = qs ·
(
a+ E[θ|Yr, Ys]− qs − βq̂SNr (qs;E)
)
= qs ·
((
1− β
2
)
a−
(
1− β
2
2
)
qs + E[θ|Yr, Ys]− β
2
(
vs
(
fSNs
)−1
(qs) + vrYr
))
.
The first order condition with respect to qs is
(
2− β
2
)
a−((2− β2)) qs+E[θ|Yr, Ys]−β(vs (fSNs )−1 (qs) + vrYr)
2
− qsβvs
2
d
(
fSNs
)−1
(qs)
dqs
= 0.
Firm r’s belief must be fulfilled in equilibrium. Thus we substitute qs = f
SN
s (Ys) into the above
equation and obtain the strategic firm’s optimal output quantity
qSNs (E) =
1− β
2− β2 (a+ vrYr + vsYs) . (3.9)
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Consequently, the routine firm’s optimal output quantity in equilibrium is
qSNr (E) =
2− β
2 (2− β2) (a+ vrYr + vsYs) . (3.10)
Suppose the strategic firm produces after the routine firm, Ts = L. As the routine firm has
shared her demand signal Yr, the strategic firm knows both Yr and Ys. Given qr, based on his
signals Ys and Yr, the strategic firm chooses qs to maximize his expected profit
πSNs (qs; qr, L) = qs · (a+ E[θ|Ys, Yr]− qs − βqr) .
Hence the strategic firm’s best response to qr is q̂
SN
s (qr;L) =
1
2 (a+ E[θ|Ys, Yr]− βqr). An-
ticipating the strategic firm’s response, the routine firm chooses qr to maximize her expected
profit based on her own signal Yr
πSNr (qr;L) = qr ·
(
a+ E[θ|Yr]− qr − βE[q̂SNs (qr;L)|Yr]
)
.
Taking derivative with respective to qr generates the routine firm’s optimal production quantity
qSNr (L) =
2− β
2 (2− β2) (a+ urYr) . (3.11)
In equilibrium the strategic firm’s optimal production quantity is
qSNs (L) =
1
2
(
4− 2β − β2
2 (2− β2) a+ vsYs + vrYr −
β (2− β)
2 (2− β2)urYr
)
. (3.12)
The Strategic Firm’s Timing Decision in Scenario SN
In Scenario SN, the strategic firm’s expected profits by producing before, simultaneously with,
and after the routine firm are, respectively,
ΠSNs (E) =
1− β
2 (2− β2)
(
a2 + (vr + vs)σ
2
)
,
ΠSNs (C) =
1
(2 + β)
2
(
a2 + urσ
2
)
+
1
4
(vr + vs − ur)σ2,
ΠSNs (L) =
(
4− 2β − β2)2
16 (2− β2)2
(
a2 + urσ
2
)
+
1
4
(vr + vs − ur)σ2.
51
Proposition 3.2 If only the routine firm shares information, the strategic firm always chooses
to produce simultaneously with the routine firm (TSNs = C).
In Scenario SN, the information asymmetry arises with the strategic firm being more in-
formed than the routine firm. Such information asymmetry changes the way that the production
timing impacts a firm’s production quantity. If the strategic firm produces before the routine
firm, he has to set a small production quantity to signal the routine firm a less favorable de-
mand, which hurts his market share. It is the no-sharing of the strategic firm that forces him to
make such a downward distortion on his expected order quantity (relative to Scenario SS), i.e.,
E[qSNs (E)] < E[q
SS
s (E)]. If the strategic firm produces after the routine firm, the routine firm
is able to occupy a high market share without any distortion on her expected production quan-
tity as she has already shared her information, i.e., E[qSNr (L)] = E[q
SS
r (L)]; that is, she gains
first-mover advantage. Therefore, the strategic firm chooses to produce simultaneously with
the routine firm to avoid the downward distortion by producing early and the second-mover
disadvantage by producing late.
It would be interesting to compare our Proposition 3.2 with the result of Mailath (1993).
Mailath considers Cournot duopoly firms with one firm (incumbent) informed of the uncertain
demand and the other (entrant) uninformed; the informed firm is endowed with the flexibility
in the timing for setting its quantity (i.e. before or simultaneously with the uninformed firm).
Mailath shows that the informed firm always chooses to set quantity before the uninformed firm.
In stark contrast, our Proposition 3.2 shows that the more informed firm (strategic firm) always
chooses to produce simultaneously with the less informed firm (routine firm). The reason for
the two contrasting results is that in Mailath (1993) the informed firm commits the timing of
setting quantity after it sees the demand signal, whereas in our study the more informed firm
(strategic firm) commits the timing of setting quantity before he observes the demand signal.
Both cases are plausible: the former is appropriate when the informed firm is an incumbent
who gains an informational advantage over an entrant, while the latter is appropriate when
both firms are already in the market and are planning production ahead of the selling season
close to which demand signals are generated.
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The Value of Flexible Timing in Scenario SN
In Scenario SN, the routine firm’s expected profits when the strategic firm producing before,
simultaneously with, and after her are, respectively,
ΠSNr (E) =
(2− β)2
4 (2− β2)2
(
a2 + (vr + vs)σ
2
)
,
ΠSNr (C) =
1
(2 + β)
2
(
a2 + urσ
2
)
,
ΠSNr (L) =
(2− β)2
8 (2− β2)
(
a2 + urσ
2
)
.
By Proposition 3.2, the strategic firm produces simultaneously with the routine firm in
Scenario SN. The value of flexible timing in Scenario SN is defined as V SN = ΠSNs (C) −
ΠSNr (C) =
(1−ur)2us
4(1−urus)σ
2 > 0, which is also the strategic firm’s informational gain from concealing
his demand signal. The flexibility of timing is beneficial if and only if (1−ur)
2us
4(1−urus)σ
2 > C,
independent of the competition intensity.
3.4.3 Scenario NS, Only Strategic Firm Sharing Information
In Scenario NS, only the strategic firm shares information. The routine firm knows Yr and Ys,
and the strategic firm only knows Ys when making their quantity decisions.
Equilibrium Quantity Decisions in Scenario NS
Similar to Scenario SS and NS, we analyze the two firms’ production quantities separately for
Ts = C, E and L.
Suppose the strategic firm produces simultaneously with the routine firm, Ts = C. The two
firms simultaneously choose their quantities based on different information. This case is similar
to case Ts = C in Scenario SN. By exchanging the indicators r and s, we obtain the firms’
equilibrium quantities
qNSr (C) =
1
2 + β
a+
1
2
vrYr +
1
2
(
vs − β
2 + β
us
)
Ys, (3.13)
and
qNSs (C) =
1
2 + β
(a+ usYs) . (3.14)
Suppose the strategic firm produces before the routine firm, Ts = E. This case is similar to
the case of Ts = L in Scenario SN. By exchanging the indicators r and s in the case Ts = L in
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Scenario SN, we obtain the firms’ equilibrium quantities
qNSs (E) =
2− β
2 (2− β2) (a+ usYs) , (3.15)
and
qNSr (E) =
1
2
(
4− 2β − β2
2 (2− β2) a+ vrYr + vsYs −
β (2− β)
2 (2− β2)usYs
)
. (3.16)
Suppose the strategic firm produces after the routine firm, Ts = L. This case is similar
to case Ts = E in Scenario SN. By exchanging the indicators r and s in the case Ts = E in
Scenario SN, we obtain the firms’ equilibrium quantities
qNSr (L) =
1− β
2− β2 (a+ vrYr + vsYs) , (3.17)
and
qNSs (L) =
2− β
2 (2− β2) (a+ vrYr + vsYs) . (3.18)
The Strategic Firm’s Timing Decision in Scenario NS
In Scenario NS, the strategic firm’s expected profits by producing before, simultaneously with,
and after the routine firm are, respectively,
ΠNSs (E) =
(2− β)2
8 (2− β2)
(
a2 + usσ
2
)
,
ΠNSs (C) =
1
(2 + β)
2
(
a2 + usσ
2
)
,
ΠNSs (L) =
(2− β)2
4 (2− β2)2
(
a2 + (vr + vs)σ
2
)
.
Proposition 3.3 If only the strategic firm shares information, she always chooses to produce
after the routine firm (TNSs = L).
In Scenario NS, the strategic firm is less informed than the routine firm. Proposition 3.3
suggests that a less informed firm should be cautious to be preemptive. Rather, the strategic
firm who is less informed, should postpone his production time. To understand why, we first
compare early production and simultaneous production. When the routine firm does not share
information, the strategic firm always prefers early production to simultaneous production
(ΠNSs (E) > Π
NS
s (C)). This is because, with either of the two production timing cases, the
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strategic firm’s quantity decision does not depend on the routine firm’s information, while
moving first enables him to set a high output quantity (first-mover advantage). We now compare
early production and late production. If the strategic firm chooses late production, he infers
the routine firm’s demand signal from her output quantity. The routine firm has to set a small
quantity to signal the strategic firm an unfavorable market, and a downward distortion on
her expected output quantity is made (E[qNSr (L)] < E[q
SS
r (L)]). This enables the strategic
firm, the second-mover though, to set an output quantity as high as by early production on
average (i.e., E[qNSs (E)] = E[q
NS
s (L)]). But the routine firm’s downward distortion on her
expected output quantity gives rise to a high selling price for the strategic firm, benefiting
him. In addition, with the inferred signal, the strategic firm can adjust the output quantity to
better meet the uncertain demand. Thus, in Scenario NS, late production outperforms other
production timing strategies, and second-mover advantage prevails.
The Value of Flexible Timing in Scenario NS
In Scenario NS, the routine firm’s expected profits when the strategic firm producing before,
simultaneously with, and after him are, respectively,
ΠNSr (E) =
(
4− 2β − β2)2
16 (2− β2)2
(
a2 + usσ
2
)
+
1
4
(vr + vs − us)σ2,
ΠNSr (C) =
1
(2 + β)
2
(
a2 + usσ
2
)
+
1
4
(vr + vs − us)σ2,
ΠNSr (L) =
1− β
2 (2− β2)
(
a2 + (vr + vs)σ
2
)
.
By Proposition 3.3, the strategic firm produces after the routine firm in equilibrium. The
value of flexible timing in Scenario NS is defined as V NS = ΠNSs (L)−ΠNSr (L) = (3−2β)β
2
4(2−β2)2 a
2 +
β2(ur+us−2urus)(3−2β)
4(2−β2)2(1−urus) σ
2 > 0. This value V NS is marginal when the competition intensity β is
small, and is significant when the competition intensity β is large. Thus the less informed firm
(strategic firm) is more willing to gain flexible timing as the competition becomes more intense.
3.4.4 Scenario NN, Neither Firm Sharing Information
In Scenario NN, neither firm shares information. The routine firm only knows Yr and the
strategic firm only knows Ys when making their quantity decisions.
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Equilibrium Quantity Decisions in Scenario NN
Similar to the previous scenarios, we analyze the two firms’ production quantities separately
for Ts = C, E and L.
Suppose the strategic firm produces simultaneously with the routine firm, Ts = C. Firm i
chooses qi to maximize its profit based on Yi
πNNiC (qi;C) = qi · (a+ E[θ|Yi]− qi − βE[qj |Yi]) ,
where the superscript NN indicates no information sharing case and the subscript i indicates
firm i (i = r, s) with Ts = C. The first order condition with respect to qi as a function of
qj is q̂
NN
i (qj ;C) =
1
2 (a+ E[θ|Yi]− βE[qj |Yi]). Simultaneously solving qNNs = q̂NNs (qNNr ) and
qNNr = q̂
NN
r (q
NN
s ) generates the equilibrium output quantity
qNNi (C) =
1
2 + β
a+
2− βuj
4− β2uiuj uiYi (3.19)
with i, j ∈ {r, s} and i 	= j.
Suppose the strategic firm produces before the routine firm, Ts = E. The strategic firm’s
production quantity qs conveys his demand signal Ys that can be inferred by the routine firm.
The routine firm believes qs = f
NN
s (Ys) where f
NN
s (·) is a linear and increasing function.
Given qs, based on her signal Yr and her belief Ys =
(
fNNs
)−1
(qs), the routine firm chooses
qr to maximize her profit
πNNrE (qr; qs, E) = qr ·
(
a+ E[θ|Yr,
(
fNNs
)−1
(qs)]− qr − βqs
)
,
and hence her best response to qs is q̂
NN
rE (qs;E) =
1
2
(
a+ E[θ|Yr,
(
fNNs
)−1
(qs)]− βqs
)
.
Knowing the routine firm’s belief, the strategic firm chooses qr to maximize his profit based
on his demand signal Ys
πNNsE (qs;Ys) = qs ·
(
a+ E[θ|Ys]− qs − βE[q̂NNrE (qs;E)|Ys]
)
= qs ·
((
1− β
2
)
a+
(
1− β
2
vr
)
usYs −
(
1− β
2
2
)
qs − β
2
vs
(
fNNs
)−1
(qs)
)
.
The first order condition with respect to qs is
(
1− β
2
)
a+
(
1− β
2
vr
)
usYs−2
(
1− β
2
2
)
qs−β
2
vs·
(
fNNs
)−1
(qs)−qs β
2
vs·
d
(
fNNs
)−1
(qs)
dqs
= 0.
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The routine firm’s belief must be fulfilled in equilibrium. Thus we substitute qs = f
NN
s (Ys)
into the above equation and obtain the strategic firm’s optimal output quantity
qNNs (E) =
1
2 (2− β2) (2− 2β + βvr) · (a+ usYs) , (3.20)
and consequently the routine firm’s optimal output quantity in equilibrium is
qNNr (E) =
1
2
(
2 (2− β)− β2vr
2 (2− β2) a+ vrYr +
(2− β) (2− 2vr − βvr)
2 (2− β2) usYs
)
. (3.21)
Suppose the strategic firm produces after the routine firm, Ts = L. This case is symmetric
to the case Ts = E in Scenario NN. We thus obtain the equilibrium quantities by exchanging
the indicators r and s, namely,
qNNr (L) =
1
2 (2− β2) (2− 2β + βvs) · (a+ urYr) ,
and
qNNs (L) =
1
2
(
2 (2− β)− β2vs
2 (2− β2) a+ vsYs +
(2− β) (2− 2vs − βvs)
2 (2− β2) urYr
)
.
The Strategic Firm’s Timing Decision
In Scenario NN, the strategic firm’s expected profits by producing before, simultaneously with,
and after the routine firm are, respectively,
ΠNNs (E) =
(2− 2β + βvr)
8 (2− β2)
(
2− 2β + βvr + 2β vs
us
)
· (a2 + usσ2) ,
ΠNNs (C) =
1
(2 + β)
2 a
2 +
(2− βur)2
(4− β2urus)2
usσ
2,
ΠNNs (L) =
(
4− 2β − β2vs
)2
16 (2− β2)2
(
a2 + urσ
2
)
+
1
4
(vr + vs − ur)σ2.
Proposition 3.4 If us >
2
2+β−βur and the demand uncertainty is not large (
σ2
a2 < δ), the
strategic firm produces simultaneously with the routine firm (TNNs = C); otherwise, he produces
after the routine firm (TNNs = L).
Proposition 3.4 is of practical importance, as in reality each firm has some private informa-
tion that she/he is unwilling, or not allowed, to share in a competitive market. This proposition
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shows that, when neither firm shares information, the strategic firm never produces before the
routine firm. In fact, early production hurts the strategic firm in two ways. On one hand, by
early production the strategic firm has to set a small expected output quantity to signal an
unfavorable market to the routine firm. On the other hand, the strategic firm’s private demand
information is correctly inferred by the routine firm. The strategic firm thus loses both market
share and information by early production.
Proposition 3.4 further reveals that the strategic firm prefers late production if and only if he
is not well informed or the demand uncertainty is large. Late production benefits the strategic
firm in two ways. On one hand, it forces the routine firm to lower her expected output quantity
to signal a low market demand, and, as quantity decisions are strategic substitutes, enables the
strategic firm to set a relatively high expected output quantity. On the other hand, the strategic
firm can correctly infer the routine firm’s demand signal aiding his quantity decision. The two
beneficial ways both stem from the signaling of demand information from the routine firm to
the strategic firm. Clearly, when the strategic firm is well informed and the demand uncertainty
is moderately low, the strategic firm is not hungry for the routine’s firm’s demand information,
making the impact of signaling insignificant and the late production unattractive to him. In
addition, when the strategic firm is well informed (i.e., us >
2
2+β−βur ), simultaneous production
gives the strategic firm a higher expected output quantity than late production. Therefore, the
strategic firm produces simultaneously with the routine firm when he is well informed or the
demand uncertainty is moderate. The expression of δ is given in the Appendix. We can further
show that δ is (weakly) decreasing in us. The strategic firm’s optimal production timing in
Scenario NN is illustrated in Figure 3.2 (with thresholds β̂ and ûr defined in the Appendix).
Gal-Or (1987) shows that the first mover may have disadvantage because it attempts to sig-
nal a low demand to the second mover. In her study, leader and follower are exogenously given,
and the production timing decision is not considered. By contrast, as our study incorporates
the strategic firm’s production timing decision, Proposition 3.4 complements Gal-Or (1987) by
showing that the strategic firm may like to produce simultaneously with the routine firm.
Because two competing firms are usually comparably informed (say Samsung and Apple),
we apply to Proposition 3.4 a special case with us = ur, and generate Corollary 3.1 as follows.
Corollary 3.1 If the two firms are equally informationally capable, the strategic firm always
produces after the routine firm.
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(a) For β < β̂ and ur < ûr
(b) For β ≥ β̂ and ur ≥ ûr
Figure 3.2: The Strategic Firm’s Optimal Production Timing
Echoing Proposition 3.3, Proposition 3.4 and Corollary 3.1 again put a firm’s preemptive
actions under scrunity. They suggest that firms’ information sharing strategies and information
capabilities are important factors for production timing.
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The Value of Flexible Timing in Scenario NN
In Scenario NN, the routine firm’s expected profits when the strategic firm producing before,
simultaneously with, and after him are, respectively,
ΠNNr (E) =
(
4− 2β − β2vr
)2
16 (2− β2)2
(
a2 + usσ
2
)
+
1
4
(vr + vs − us)σ2,
ΠNNr (C) =
1
(2 + β)
2 a
2 +
(2− βus)2
(4− β2usur)2
urσ
2,
ΠNNr (L) =
(2− 2β + βvs)
8 (2− β2)
(
2− 2β + βvs + 2β vr
ur
)
· (a2 + urσ2) .
The value of flexible timing in Scenario NN is defined as V NN = ΠNNs (C) − ΠNNr (C) =
us−ur
4−β2urusσ
2, if us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 < δ(ur, us, β), and otherwise V
NN = ΠNNs (L)−ΠNNr (L) =
β2(2−us(2+β−βur))(6−4β−us((4−3β)ur+(2−β)))
16(2−β2)2(1−urus)2
(
a2 + urσ
2
)
+
v2s
4
(
1
us
− ur
)
σ2. For us >
2
2+β−βur
or σ
2
a2 < δ(ur, us, β), it can be shown that V
NN is always positive. However, for us >
2
2+β−βur
and σ
2
a2 ≥ δ(ur, us, β), we numerically test that there is a region within which V NN is negative.
For example, let us = 0.98, ur = 0.5, and β = 0.1; we have δ(ur, us, β) = −3.253 < 0,
V NN = −1.051 × 10−5 (a2 + 12σ2) + 0.120σ2 which is negative for small σ (say a = 1 and
σ = 0.005).
Corollary 3.2 In Scenario NN, the strategic firm’s flexibility of production timing may make
him worse than the routine firm, even if the cost for timing flexibility is zero (C = 0).
Corollary 3.2 states that, in Scenario NN, a firm may not like to be strategic in pro-
duction timing even if it is costless. For parameters satisfying V NN < 0, being strategic
means producing after the routine firm. However, this choice of production timing, optimal
for the strategic firm though, does not necessarily translate to better market share for him.
In fact, the strategic firm’s expected output quantity is smaller than the routine firm’s (i.e.,
E[qNNs (L)] < E[q
NN
r (L)]), if the strategic firm’s demand information is very accurate and the
routine firm’s is not accurate where the signaling issue is not pronounced. Intuitively, when the
strategic firm has a very accurate demand signal, he makes his quantity decision relying mainly
on his own signal. The routine firm does not need to lower her expected output quantity too
much, while the strategic firm’s late production endows the routine firm first-mover advantage
in occupying the market.
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3.4.5 Information Sharing Arrangements
We examine the impact of each firm’s information sharing decision to quantify the value for
information sharing, and then characterize firms’ equilibrium information sharing arrangements.
Lemma 3.1 The information sharing of the routine firm makes the strategic firm move forward
his production time.
Lemma 3.1 reveals the external timing switching effect of routine firm’s information sharing
whereby the rival strategic firm uses different production timing depending on whether or not
the routine firm shares her demand information. In particular, when Xs = S (Xs = N), the
strategic firm’s production timing changes from TNSs (T
NN
s ) to T
SS
s (T
SN
s ) as Xr changes from
N to S. Obviously, by Propositions 3.1 and 3.3, TSSs = E is strictly ahead of T
NS
s = L; by
Propositions 3.2 and 3.4, TSNs = T
NN
s = C if and only if us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 < δ, and
otherwise TSNs = C is strictly ahead of T
NN
s = L. If the routine firm shares information,
the strategic firm does not deliberately delay its production time to infer the routine firm’s
information (i.e., TSXss 	= L).
Lemma 3.2 (i) When the strategic firm shares information (Xs = S), information sharing of
the routine firm makes her output quantity higher in expectation and more responsive to her
demand signal. (ii) When the strategic firm does not share information (Xs = N), information
sharing of the routine firm makes her output quantity (weakly) higher in expectation and more
responsive to her demand signal if us <
2
2+β−βur or
σ2
a2 < δ, and makes it lower in expectation
and less responsive to her demand signal otherwise.
When the strategic firm shares information, the two firms always produce sequentially.
The routine firm’s disclosure of information has a strong external timing switching effect: the
strategic firm changes from late production to early production. By disclosing her information,
the routine firm does not need to use her output quantity to signal her demand information,
giving her higher expected output quantity and making her information more valuable.
Now consider the case when the strategic firm does not share his information. If us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 < δ, the routine firm’s disclosure of information does not change the strategic
firm’s production timing, and hence the expected output quantities remain unchanged. How-
ever, as his own demand information is accurate and the demand uncertainty is small, the
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strategic firm responds negatively to the routine firm’s shared signal, which enables the routine
firm to respond more strongly to her own signal. If us <
2
2+β−βur or
σ2
a2 > δ, the strategic
firm switches from late production to simultaneous production as the routine firm discloses
information (external timing switching effect). Yet such switch of production timing impacts
the routine firm’s output quantity in two opposite directions. On one hand, comparing to the
sequential production under asymmetric information, simultaneous production can induce a
lower total expected output quantity, a downside for the routine firm. On the other hand,
simultaneous production removes the signaling issue which involves the routine firm’s quantity
distortions, an upside for the routine firm. If us <
2
2+β−βur , because he is not well informed, the
strategic firm is eager for the routine firm’s information and the signaling issue is pronounced,
and simultaneous production makes the routine firm’s output quantity higher in expectation
and more responsive to her signal; the reverse is true otherwise (i.e., us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 > δ).
Given the strategic firm’s information sharing decisionXs, the routine firm’s value of sharing
her demand information is defined as Wr (Xs) = Π
SXs
r
(
TSXss
)−ΠNXsr (TNXss ).
Proposition 3.5 (i)Wr(S) > 0; (ii) Wr(N) > 0 if and only if us <
2
2+β−βur or
σ2
a2 < δ.
Proposition 3.5 (i) states that the value for the routine firm to share information is always
positive, if the strategic firm shares information. Proposition 3.5 (ii) states that, if the strategic
firm does not share information, the value for the routine firm to share information is positive
when the strategic firm is less informed or the demand uncertainty is low. These two results
directly follow from Lemma 3.2 (i) and (ii), respectively.
Lemma 3.3 The information sharing of the strategic firm makes him: (i) move forward his
production time, if the routine firm shares information (Xr = S), and (ii) (weakly) delay his
production time, if the routine firm does not share information (Xr = N).
Lemma 3.3 reveals the internal timing switching effect of strategic firm’s information sharing
whereby the strategic firm uses different production timing depending on his own information
disclosure policy. The strategic firm’s disclosure of the information may lead to his advancing
or postponed production timing, according to different information sharing arrangements of the
routine firm. In particular, when Xr = S (Xr = N), the strategic firm’s production timing
changes from TSNs (T
NN
s ) to T
SS
s (T
NS
s ) asXs changes fromN to S. Obviously, by Propositions
3.1 and 3.2, TSSs = E is strictly ahead of T
SN
s = C; by Propositions 3.3 and 3.4, T
NS
s = L is
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strictly later than TNNs = C if and only if us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 < δ, and T
NS
s = T
NN
s = L
otherwise. Given that the routine firm shares information (Xr = S), by sharing his information,
the strategic firm is able to preemptively occupy the market (first mover advantage) without
incurring the signaling issue. Given that the routine firm does not share information (Xr = N),
by sharing his information, the strategic firm suffers from informational disadvantage and hence
he postpones the production time to infer the routine firm’s information.
Lemma 3.4 When the routine firm shares information (Xr = S), information sharing of the
strategic firm makes his output quantity higher in expectation, while makes it less responsive
to his demand signal. (ii) When the routine firm does not share information (Xr = N),
information sharing of the strategic firm makes his output quantity higher in expectation, while
makes it less responsive to his demand signal if us <
2ur(−4β+β3+4)−4β(β−1)
ur(β(2β+β2−4)ur−6β2+β3+8) or
σ2
a2 > δ and
more responsive to his demand signal otherwise.
By sharing his demand information, the strategic firm adjusts his production timing accord-
ingly (the internal timing switching effect). Lemma 3.4 states that the strategic firm’s flexibility
in production timing endows him higher expected output quantity, regardless of whether or not
the routine firm shares information. The strategic firm’s information disclosure will make the
routine firm’s quantity qr positively responsive to Ys. As the quantity decisions are strategic
substitutes, an increase in the responsiveness of qr to Ys makes qs less responsive to it. Unless
Ys is very accurate, information sharing of the strategic firm forces him to respond less strongly
to Ys.
Given the routine firm’s information sharing decisionXr, the strategic firm’s value of sharing
his demand information is defined as Ws (Xr) = Π
XrS
s
(
TXrSs
)−ΠXrNs (TXrNs ).
Proposition 3.6 (i)Ws(S) > 0 if and only if us < û
S
s or
σ2
a2 < η
S
s ; (ii) Ws(N) > 0 if and only
if us < û
N
s or
σ2
a2 < η
N
s .
Proposition 3.6 states that the value for the strategic firm to share information is positive
when his information is less accurate or the demand uncertainty is low. The strategic firm’s
information disclosure makes his expected output quantity larger. This is an upside for him
through the certainty part of demand (i.e., a2 term). However, his disclosure of information
can reduce the responsiveness of his output quantity to his demand signal. This is a downside
for him through the uncertainty part of demand (i.e., σ2 term). The upside dominates the
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downside when information plays a less important role to the strategic firm (us is small or
demand uncertainty is low). The expressions of ûSs , û
N
s , η
S
s and η
N
s can be found in the
Appendix.
Proposition 3.7 (i) If us < û
S
s or
σ2
a2 < η
S
s , (S, S) is the unique equilibrium, and consequently
the strategic firm produces before the routine firm. (ii) If us > û
S
s and η
S
s <
σ2
a2 < δ, (S, N)
is the unique equilibrium, and consequently the strategic firm produces simultaneously with the
routine firm. (iii) If us > û
S
s and
σ2
a2 > δ, (N, N) is the unique equilibrium, and consequently
the strategic firm produces after the routine firm.
Proposition 3.7 follows from Propositions 3.5 and 3.6. The two firms’ information sharing
strategies depend on their information capabilities and the demand uncertainty, shown in Figure
3.3. Proposition 3.7 generates two important managerial insights into horizontal information
sharing between competing firms. First, a firm’s strategic timing in production can fundamen-
tally change over his and his rival’s information sharing strategy. Vives (1984) shows that with
substitutes, it involves no pooling of information in Cournot competition. By contrast, our
Proposition 3.7 shows that both firms voluntarily sharing information can be reached when the
strategic firm is less informed or the demand uncertainty is low. This is driven by the strategic
firm’s incentive for early production to gain first mover advantage when information is less
important to him. Second, partial information sharing can appear automatically when us is
large and σ2/a2 is intermediate. A firm’s information sharing strategy depends on his (her)
characteristics in production timing. For a routine firm, making her demand information pub-
lic is beneficial unless us and σ
2/a2 are large. For a strategic firm, concealing his information
brings him informational advantage due to his flexibility in production timing. The flexibility
of production timing can help explain diverse partial information sharing practices.
Proposition 3.7 also has implications in supply chain management. Consider two competing
firms sourcing from a common upstream supplier. Anand and Goyal (2009) and Kong et
al. (2013) show that in most cases the common supplier will leak one firm’s order quantity,
containing his/her private demand information, to the rival firm. When production timing is
incorporated, it may be to the favor of both firms by allowing the common supplier to pool the
downstream demand information together and to make it publicly available.
Corollary 3.3 If the routine firm’s demand signal is accurate (ur >
(4−3β)(β+2)2
2(β+4)(2−β2)), both firms
have incentives to voluntarily share their demand signals.
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(a) For β < β̂ and ur < ûr
(b) For β ≥ β̂ and ur ≥ ûr
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium Strategies in Information Sharing
When the routine firm can accurately forecast the demand, she is better off by sharing the
demand information. The more accurate the routine firm’s demand signal, the strategic firm
is in acuter need for that signal. To avoid the severe consequences of signaling, the routine
firm simply shares her demand signal onto the common platform. The strategic firm balances
between sharing his demand signal with early production and not sharing with simultaneous
production. It turns out that the first-mover advantage gained by sharing the signal outweighs
the informational advantage gained by not sharing.
Proposition 3.8 When competition is getting more intense, full information sharing (S, S) is
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more likely to be the equilibrium outcome.
We would expect firms less willing to share information when competition becomes more
intense, because by concealing information a firm gains informational advantage. However,
Proposition 3.8 shows that the more intense the competition, the more willing the firms to
share information. This result is driven by the strategic firm’s increased incentive for early
production to occupy the market and to gain first mover advantage, in response to more fierce
competition. But he has to disclose information to achieve this goal (otherwise early-production
will cause him to lower his output quantity to signal the routine firm an unfavorable market).
In turn, the routine firm is more willing to share information (Proposition 3.5), in response
to more intense competition. In an extreme case, when β is close to one, both firms sharing
information is always the equilibrium.
One may expect that information sharing between competitors hurts consumers because
they can make decisions based on more accurate information. It’s imperative for us to study
consumer surplus if firm’s production timing is endogenous. According to Vives (1983), the
total surplus is
U (qs, qr) = (a+ θ) (qs + qr)− 1
2
(
q2s + 2βqsqr + q
2
r
)
,
and the consumer Surplus (CS) is
CS = U (qs, qr)−Π,
where Π = Πs+Πr, the total profit of the two firms. Substituting firms’ equilibrium quantities
into the above equations and comparing expected consumer surplus and expected total surplus
in the four information sharing scenarios, we conclude the following proposition.
Proposition 3.9 Information sharing between the routine and the strategic firms improves the
expected consumer surplus and the expected total surplus.
The issue of information sharing between competitors is critical from an antitrust perspec-
tive. Proposition 3.9 states that when the two firms compete in quantity, their information
sharing benefits the consumers and the social welfare. By sharing information, the firms can
effectively respond to high demand states by producing more. Besides, pooling information can
induce sequential production and hence can increase the total output quantity. Proposition
3.9 suggests that for Cournot competition with substitutable goods, public policy should not
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intervene firms information sharing behaviors or deincentivize them from publishing their sales
forecast data.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
Prior studies have investigated competing firms’ incentive to share private demand information
based on which they make production decisions concurrently. For instance, Clarke (1983), Vives
(1984), and Gal-or (1985) show that firms offering substitutable products have no incentive to
share private demand information with each other in Cournot competition. We endogenize
firms’ production timing and find that it can be one important driving force for firms’ infor-
mation sharing incentive. Specifically, we develop a game-theoretic model with one routine
firm whose production timing is fixed and one strategic firm who can choose production timing
strategically, and study firms’ incentive to share demand information and the strategic firm’s
production timing decision. When firms make production decisions sequentially, in addition to
the advantage from moving earlier to preempt the rival, we identify one important disadvantage
of the first mover: leaking private information to the rival who can then make a decision based
on more accurate information. Due to such leakage effect affects, both firms sharing information
or exactly one firm sharing information can arise in equilibrium, which is impossible when firms
have to product concurrently. Surprisingly, more intense competition makes firms more likely
to share demand information.
There are a number of directions worth of further exploration. First, we focus on the infor-
mation leakage effect of endogenous production timing. In some product categories, production
learning effect can be significant and hence production cost can depend on production timing.
It is interesting to study how production learning effect affects competing firms’ production
timing. Second, we focus on demand information, and it is interesting to study how other types
of private information (e.g., private cost information) may affect firms’ information sharing
incentive and production timing. Because these extensions require different modes of analysis,
they are left for future research.
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Appendix A: Analysis of Chapter 2
Appendix A1: Analysis of the Separating Equilibrium in Two-Period
Model
Substituting
E
[
πN1R
(
qN1H
) |A0 = H] = (μH1 − qN1H − wN1 ) qN1H ,
E
[
πN1R
(
qN1L
) |A0 = L] = (μL1 − qN1L − wN1 ) qN1L,
E
[
πN1R
(
qN1L
) |A0 = H] = (μH1 − qN1L − wN1 ) qN1L,
E
[
πN1R
(
qN1H
) |A0 = L] = (μL1 − qN1H − wN1 ) qN1H ,
E
[
πN2R
(
qN1H
) |A0 = H] = 1
4
(
μH1 − 1
2
μH2
)2
PHH +
1
4
(
μL1 − 1
2
μH2
)2
(1− PHH) ,
E
[
πN2R
(
qN1L
) |A0 = L] = 1
4
(
μH1 − 1
2
μL2
)2
PLH +
1
4
(
μL1 − 1
2
μL2
)2
(1− PLH) ,
E
[
πN2R
(
qN1L
) |A0 = H] = 1
4
(
μH1 − 1
2
μL2
)2
PHH +
1
4
(
μL1 − 1
2
μL2
)2
(1− PHH) ,
E
[
πN2R
(
qN1H
) |A0 = L] = 1
4
(
μH1 − 1
2
μL1
)2
PLH +
1
4
(
μL1 − 1
2
μH2
)2
(1− PLH) ,
into the problem, we can simplify the problem to
E
[
πNR
(
qN1H
) |A0 = H] = max
qN1H
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
(
μH1 − qN1H − wN1
)
qN1H +
1
4
(
μH1 − 12μH2
)2
PHH
+ 14
(
μL1 − 12μH2
)2
(1− PHH)
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (3.22)
subject to
(
μL1 − q̃N1L
(
wN1
)− wN1 ) q̃N1L (wN1 )− (μH2 − μL2) (μH2 − 3μL2)16 ≥ (μL1 − qN1H − wN1 ) qN1H
(3.23)
qN1H ≥ 0 (3.24)
And
E
[
πNR
(
qN1L
) |A0 = L] = max
qN1L
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
(
μL1 − qN1L − wN1
)
qN1L +
1
4
(
μH1 − 12μL2
)2
PLH
+ 14
(
μL1 − 12μL2
)2
(1− PLH)
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (3.25)
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subject to
(
μH1 − q̃N1H
(
wN1
)− wN1 ) q̃N1H (wN1 )− (μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)16 ≥ (μH1 − qN1L − wN1 ) qN1L
(3.26)
qN1L ≥ 0 (3.27)
If the low-type retailer mimics the high-type by deciding a high retail quantity, on one hand,
the manufacturer will believes A0 = H and charge a high wholesale price, which hurts the
retailer period-2’s profit. On the other hand, the high retail quantity will lead to low retail
price and profit margin, hurting the retailer. So the low-type retailer has no incentives to mimic
the high-type retailer. So constraint (3.26) does not bind and the high-type retailer maximizes
his profit by setting q̃N1H
(
wN1
)
= 12
(
μH1 − wN1
)
. The problem for the low-type retailer reduces
to
E
[
πNR
(
qN1L
) |A0 = L] = max
qN1L
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
(
μL1 − qN1L − wN1
)
qN1L +
1
4PLHμ
2
H1
+ 14 (1− PLH)μ2L1 − 316μ2L2
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (3.28)
subject to
1
4
(
μH1 − wN1
)2 − 1
16
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2) ≥
(
μH1 − qN1L − wN1
)
qN1L; (3.29)
qN1L ≥ 0. (3.30)
The Lagrangian function for the above problem is
£
(
qN1L, μ
)
6 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(
μL1 − qN1L − wN1
)
qN1L +
1
4PLHμ
2
H1
+ 14 (1− PLH)μ2L1 − 316μ2L2
+λ
⎛⎜⎝ 14 (μH1 − wN1 )2 − 116 (μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
− (μH1 − qN1L − wN1 ) qN1L
⎞⎟⎠
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
.
The Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions for the Lagrangian function are
i) stationarity condition: ∂
∂qN1L
£
(
qN1L, μ
) ≤ 0;
ii) complementary slackness: λ( 14
(
μH1 − wN1
)2 − 116 (μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2) − (μH1 − qN1L
− wN1 )qN1L) = 0
iii) primal feasibility: 14
(
μH1 − wN1
)2 − 116 (μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2) ≥ (μH1 − qN1L − wN1 ) qN1L
iv) dual feasibility: μ ≥ 0.
6The participation constraint is always satisfied.
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Solving the above conditions, we can get if λ = 0,
q̃N1L
(
wN1
)
=
1
2
(
μL1 − wN1
)
,
and the primal feasibility implies
φ ≥ 1 + 2 (α− 1)
2
(5− 4β)α2 + 2 (3β + β2 − 5)α+ (4− 3β2) .
For λ > 0,
q̃N1L =
1
2
(
μH1 − wN1 ±
1
2
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
)
.
We abandon the solution 12
(
μH1 − wN1 + 12
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
)
, that is, if φ < 1 +
2(α−1)2
(5−4β)α2+2(3β+β2−5)α+(4−3β2) , q̃
N
1L =
1
2
(
μH1 − wN1 − 12
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
)
. The rea-
son is that the unconstrained maximum of equation (3.28) is 12
(
μL1 − wN1
)
, and the max-
imum of right hand side of (3.29) is 12
(
μH1 − wN1
)
. It’s easy to see that 12 (μH1 − wN1 −√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)
2 ) <
μL1−wN1
2 <
μH1−wN1
2 <
μH1−wN1 + 12
√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)
2 , and the right
hand side of (3.29) is increasing in
[
1
2
(
μL1 − wN1
)
, 12
(
μH1 − wN1
)]
, so the high-type retailer al-
ways has incentive to mimic the low-type retailer if q̃N1L =
1
2 (μH1−wN1 +
√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)
2 ).
To separate from the high-type retailer, the low-type retailer has to decide a retail quantity
lower than 12
(
μL1 − wN1
)
, that is, q̃N1L =
μH1−wN1 − 12
√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)
2 .
Appendix A2: Analysis of the Pooling Equilibrium in Two-Period
Model
The retailer’s problem
max
qN1
E
[
πNR
(
qN1 ≤ q̂N1
) |A0 = H] = E [πNR (qN1 = q̂N1 ) |A0 = H] (3.31)
max
qN1
E
[
πNR
(
qN1 ≤ q̂N1
) |A0 = L] = E [πNR (qN1 = q̂N1 ) |A0 = L] (3.32)
E
[
πNR
(
q̂N1
) |A0 = H] ≥ E [πNR (qN1 > q̂N1 ) |A0 = H] , (3.33)
E
[
πNR
(
q̂N1
) |A0 = L] ≥ E [πNR (qN1 > q̂N1 ) |A0 = L] , (3.34)
q̂N1 ≥ 0 (3.35)
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We use qN1H represents q
N
1 > q̂
N
1 . Substituting
E
[
πN1R
(
qN1
) |A0 = H] = (μH1 − qN1 − wN1 ) qN1
E
[
πN1R
(
qN1
) |A0 = L] = (μL1 − qN1 − wN1 ) qN1
E
[
πN2R
(
qN1
) |A0 = H] = 1
4
(
μH1 − 1
2
μ
)2
PHH +
1
4
(
μL1 − 1
2
μ
)2
(1− PHH)
E
[
πN2R
(
qN1
) |A0 = L] = 1
4
(
μH1 − 1
2
μ
)2
PLH +
1
4
(
μL1 − 1
2
μ
)2
(1− PLH)
E
[
πN2,R
(
qN1H
) |A0 = H] = 1
4
(
μH1 − 1
2
μH2
)2
PHH +
1
4
(
μL1 − 1
2
μH2
)2
(1− PHH)
E
[
πN2,R
(
qN1H
) |A0 = L] = 1
4
(
μH1 − 1
2
μH2
)2
PLH +
1
4
(
μL1 − 1
2
μH2
)2
(1− PLH)
into the above problem, the problem is reduced to
max
qN1
(
μH1 − q̂N1 − wN1
)
q̂N1 ≥
(
μH1 − qN1 − wN1
)
qN1 (3.36)
max
qN1
(
μL1 − q̂N1 − wN1
)
q̂N1 ≥
(
μL1 − qN1 − wN1
)
qN1 (3.37)(
μH1 − q̂N1 − wN1
)
q̂N1 +
(μH2 − μ) (3μH2 − μ)
16
≥ (μH1 − qN1H − wN1 ) qN1H (3.38)(
μL1 − q̂N1 − wN1
)
q̂N1 +
(μ− μH2) (μ+ μH2 − 4μL2)
16
≥ (μL1 − qN1H − wN1 ) qN1H (3.39)
q̂N1 ≥ 0
Equation (3.36) and (3.37) are satisfied if q̂N1 ≤ min
{
(μH1−wN1 )
2 ,
(μL1−wN1 )
2
}
=
(μL1−wN1 )
2 .
The low-type retailer will not pool at a quantity greater than 12
(
μL1 − wN1
)
, because he can
set his quantity to 12
(
μL1 − wN1
)
and earn more profits. Since E[πNR (q
N
1 ≤ qN1 )|A0 = H]
and E
[
πNR
(
qN1 ≤ qN1
) |A0 = L] are increasing in qN1 , so the pooling equilibrium outcome is
q̂N1
(
wN1
)
= 12
(
μL1 − wN1
)
. Substituting q̂N1
(
wN1
)
= 12
(
μL1 − wN1
)
into (3.38) and (3.39), we
can find that constraint (3.39) is satisfied and constraint (3.38) hold if and only if 1 < φ <
1 + 2(α−1)
2
α3−7α2β+2α2+4αβ2+6αβ−7α−4β2+5β .
Appendix A3: Analysis of the Separating Equilibrium in the Infinite-
Period Model
Recall that qNt (At−2 = s,At−1 = H) = Q
NI
sH , q
N
t (At−2 = s,At−1 = L) = Q
N
sL and w
N
t (At−2
= s) = WNs . The low-type retailer has no incentives to mimic the high-type retailer by setting
a high order quantity because, on one hand, the high order quantity will lead to a low retail
price and a low retail margin for the retailer, which hurts himself. On the other hand, the
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manufacturer will believe the demand is high and charge a high price in the next period, which
also hurts the retailer. So the high-type retailer is ex post efficient and sets the wholesale price
to
qNt (At−2 = s,At−1 = H) =
1
2
(
μH1 − wNt (At−2 = s)
)
. (3.40)
The problem for the low-type retailer reduces to
max
QNsL
{(
μL1 −QNsL −WNs
)
QNsL + E
[
πN(t+1)R
(
QNsL
) |At−1 = L,At−2 = s]}
subject to
1
4
(
μH1 −WNs
)2 −Δts ≥ (μH1 −QNsL −WNs )QNsL,
where Δts = E
[
πN(t+1)R
(
QNsL
) |At−1 = H,At−2 = s]−E [πN(t+1)R (QNsH) |At−1 = H,At−2 = s].
Same as the two-period model, we construct the Lagrangian function for the above prob-
lem and use the K.K.T. condition to solve the problem, we can get that if 14 (μH1 − μL1)2 −
1
4
(
WNH −WNL
) (
2μL1 (1− β) + 2βμH1 −WNH −WNL
) ≥ 0,
QNsL =
1
2
(
μL1 −WNs
)
, (3.41)
otherwise,
QNsL =
1
2
μH1 − 1
2
WNs −
√
Δts. (3.42)
Given the retailer’s best response and the belief, the manufacturer maximizes
E
[
πNtM |At−2 = s
]
= WNs E
[
qNt |At−2 = s
]
,
where E
[
qNt |At−2 = s
]
=
(
QNsH Pr (At−1 = H|At−2 = s) +QNsL Pr (At−1 = L|At−2 = s)
)
. Solv-
ing the game we can get the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale prices are
WNH =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2μH2 if φ ≥ φ̃,
1
2PLH+2
(4 (1− PHH)Q+ μH1PHH + μH1PLH) otherwise,
,
WNL =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
2μL2 if φ ≥ φ̃,
1
PLH+1
(2 (1− PLH)Q+ μH1PLH) otherwise,
where Q =
μH1(4−4P 2HHPLH−3P 2HH+4PHHP 2LH+6PHHPLH−3P 2LH)+4μL1(PLH+1)(PHH−1)(PHH−PLH)
−8PHH+8PLH+4P 2HH−4P 2LH+16
.
Substituting the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price into the retailer’s best response, we
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can get the retailer’s equilibrium retail quantities are if φ ≥ φ̃,
QNHH =
1
2
(
μH1 − 1
2
μH2
)
,
QNLH =
1
2
(
μH1 − 1
2
μL2
)
,
QNHL =
1
2
(
μL1 − 1
2
μH2
)
,
QNLL =
1
2
(
μL1 − 1
2
μL2
)
.
Otherwise,
QNHH =
1
4PLH + 4
(2μH1 − μH1PHH + μH1PLH − 4 (1− PHH)Q) ,
QNLH =
1
2PLH + 2
(μH1 − 2Q+ 2QPLH) ,
QNHL =
1
4PLH + 4
(4Q (1 + PHH)− μH1PHH + μH1PLH) ,
QNLL = Q.
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Appendix B: Proofs for Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof.
ΠBSM −ΠBNM =
1
8
α (α− β)2 (H − L)2
1− α > 0,
ΠBSR −ΠBNR = −
3
16
α (α− β)2 (H − L)2
1− α < 0,
ΠBS −ΠBN = − 1
16
α (α− β)2 (H − L)2
1− α < 0.
So information sharing benefits the manufacturer, but hurts the retailer and the supply chain.
Because the amount that the manufacturer is willing to pay the retailer is less than that the
retailer is willing to accept, i.e., ΠBSM −ΠBNM .< ΠBNR −ΠBSR , so information sharing agreement
cannot be achieved even with side payment.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proof. We use the Intuitive Criterion to refine the equilibrium. Let t and T be the retailer’s
type and types set, then T = {H,L} and t ∈ T . The retailer sends a message (retail quantity)
q1 from the action set Q (t) and the types set that have message q1 is T (q1). Observing the
retailer’s message q1, the manufacturer chooses her wholesale price (w2) from a set W (q1) to
respond to the message. The payoff to the manufacturer and the retailer are uM (t, q1, w2)
and uR (t, q1, w2), respectively. χ (t) is the manufacturer’s belief system, u
∗
R (t) is the retailer’s
equilibrium payoff. The manufacturer’s best response satisfies
BR (q1, T (q1)) = arg max
w2∈W (q1)
∑
uM (t, q1, w2)χ (t) .
According to Cho and Kreps (1987),We exam whether an equilibrium of signaling game
satisfies the Intuitive Criterion in two steps:
i) for each off-equilibrium message q1, form the set of S (m) consisting of all types t such that
u∗R (t) ≥ max
w2∈BR(q1,T (q1))
uR (t, q1, w2);
ii) if for any message q1, and t
′ ∈ T (m) \S (m) such that u∗ (t′) ≥ min
w2∈BR(q1,T (q1))
uR (t
′, q1, w2),
then the equilibrium satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
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First, we prove that the separating equilibrium satisfies the Intuitive Criterion. a) q1 > q
N∗
1,H .
If q1 > q̃
N
1H , then S (q1) = {L}, by requirement i. The low-type retailer’s equilibrium payoff is
always grearer than the off-equilibrium payoff by choose an action greater than q̃N1H . Step i is
satisfied. t′ ∈ T (m) \S (m) = {H}, i.e., the manufacturer will believe that only the high-type
retailer sends the message q1 > q̃
N
1H . Given the manufacturer’s belief, the high-type retailer is
decreasing in q1 if q1 > q̃
N
1H , so requirement ii of the Intuitive Criterion is satisfied. Similarly,
one can verify that the two conditions are satisfied if q̃N1L < q1 < q̃
N
1H and q1 < q̃
N
1L. So the
separating equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion.
Now we show that the pooling equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion. The high-type
retailer will not deviate to a retail quantity qN1 ≤ 12μH1 − 12 ŵN1 − 14
√
(μ− μH2) (μ− 3μH2)
even though he will be considered as low-type. But the low-type retailer will deviate to qN1 ≤
1
2μH1 − 12 ŵN1 − 14
√
(μ− μH2) (μ− 3μH2) as long as the manufacturer holds the belief that the
deviation is not from the high-type retailer. So by the definition of the Intuitive Criterion, the
pooling equilibrium does not surivve the Intuitive Criterion.
Proof of Lemma 2.5
Proof. (a) If φ ≥ φ̃,
∂
∂β
ΠNM =
1
2
α (H − L)2 (α− β)
3
(α− 1)3 > 0
∂
∂β
ΠNR =
1
4
α (H − L)2 (α− β) −8α+ α
2 − 3β2 + 6αβ + 4
(α− 1)3 > 0
if φ < φ̃, ∂∂βΠ
N
M =
1
8
(
X1
√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)+X2
(1−α)4
√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)
)
> 18
(
X1(μH2−μL2)+X2
(1−α)4
√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)
)
> 0,
where X1 = (2 (α− 1)4 (H − L) (Hβ − L (β − 1)) + 4α (α− 1) (H − L)2 (α− β)3 − 2(L(α3 −
4α2β + 2αβ2 + 6αβ − 3α − 3β2 + 1) + H (4α2β − α3 + α2 − 2αβ2 − 6αβ + α+ 3β2)) (α− 1)
(H − L) ( 12α− 12) (α− β)) and X2 = (α− 1)5 (H − L) (μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2) − 2(L(α3 −
4α2β+2αβ2+6αβ−3α−3β2+1)+H(4α2β−α3+α2−2αβ2−6αβ+α+3β2)) (α− 1) (H − L) (Hβ−
L (β − 1)) (α− β). One can show that X1 > 0 and X2 < 0. Hence ∂∂βΠNM > 0.
To prove ∂∂βΠ
N
R > 0, we first prove that E
[
πNR
(
qN1H
) |A0 = H] and E[πNR (qN1L) |A0 =
L] are increasing in β, then prove that ΠNR is increasing in β.
∂
∂βE
[
πNR
(
qN1H
) |A0 = H] =
1
8 (μH1 +
1
2 (1− α)
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2))
(
H − L+ 12 (1− α)
∂
∂β (μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)
2
√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)
)2
+ 14 (H − L) (α− β) −L−3Hβ+Lα+3Lβ+3Hβ
2−3Lβ2
(α−1)2 > 0.
∂
∂βE
[
πNR
(
qN1L
) |A0 = L] = (X3 + X4 ∗√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2))/(2 (α− 1)4
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)) > (X3 + X4( 53μH2 −
μL2))/(2 (α− 1)4
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)) > 0, where X3 = (1−α)
3(H−L)
8
(
α2 + 3
)
(μH2 −
75
μL2) (3μH2 − μL2) + 14 (H − L) (α− 1)4 (α− β) (3μH1 − 2μL1 + αμH1 − 2αμL1) (β ∗ (3− 2α) ∗
(2α− β) (H − L)+(3α− α3 − 1)L+α (α2 − α− 1)H)/ (α− 1)4 andX4 = 18 (H − L) (((−2α3−
5α2 − 9)β3 + 3α (12α− 3α2 + 2α3 + 5)β2 + (19α4 − 5α5 − 38α3 − 39α2 + 21α− 6)β + α(4−
17α + 33α2 − 2α3 − 3α4 + α5))H + L((2α3 + 5α2 + 9)β3 − 3α (12α− 3α2 + 2α3 + 5)β2 +(
5α5 − 18α4 + 30α3 + 49α2 − 21α+ 3)β + (2α5 − α6 + 12α4 − 47α3 + 17α2 + 3α− 2))). One
can easily verify that X3 > 0 and X4 < 0. So
∂
∂βΠ
N
R =
∂
∂βE
[
πNR
(
qN1H
) |A0 = H]α +
∂
∂βE
[
πNR
(
qN1L
) |A0 = L] (1− α) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof.
ΠSM =
1
4
(
μ2H1α+ μ
2
L1 (1− α)
)
,
ΠSR =
1
8
(
μ2H1α+ μ
2
L1 (1− α)
)
.
ΠNM =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
8
(
μ2 + μ2H2α+ μ
2
L2 (1− α)
)
, if φ ≥ φ̃,
1
8
⎛⎜⎝
(
μH1 − 12 (1− α)
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
)2
+μ2H2α+ μ
2
L2 (1− α)
⎞⎟⎠ , if φ < φ̃,
ΠNR =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
4
(
2μ2H1α+ 2μ
2
L1 (1− α)− 34μ2 − 34μ2H2α− 34μ2L2 (1− α)
)
, if φ ≥ φ̃,⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(8α−3)
16 μ
2
H1 +
1
4 (1− α)μL1 (μH1 + μL1)
+ 3(α+1)(α−3)64 μ
2
H2 +
(1−α)(α+3)
16 μL2μH2 +
(α+15)(α−1)
64 μ
2
L2
+
(2α+3)(1−α)μH1−2(1−α2)μL1
16
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭ , if φ < φ̃.
(a) If φ ≥ φ̃, ΠSM − ΠNM = 18α (H − L)2 (β − α)2 2(1−α)
2−(β−α)2
(1−α)3 >
1
8
α(H−L)2(β−α)2
1−α > 0;
ΠSR −ΠNR = − 316
α(α−β)2(H−L)2(2(1−α)2−(β−α)2)
(1−α)3 < 0.
(b) If φ < φ̃, ΠSM − ΠNM > 18
(
μ2 −
(
μH1 − 12 (1− α)
√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2)
)2)
+(
1
8
(
μ2H1α+ μ
2
L1 (1− α)
)− 18 (μ2H2α+ μ2L2 (1− α))) > 0, the first inequality holds because
μ2H1α + μ
2
L1 (1− α) ≥ μ2 and the second inequality holds because μ2 > (μH1 − 12 (1− α)√
(μH2 − μL2) (3μH2 − μL2))2 and
(
μ2H1α+ μ
2
L1 (1− α)
) ≥ (μ2H2α+ μ2L2 (1− α)).
ΠSR −ΠNR = Y1 − Y2, where Y1 = − 116μ2H1 (2α+ 4PLH + 4αPHH − 4αPLH − 3) + 18μ2L1(−α
+ 2PLH + 2αPHH − 2αPLH − 1)− 14μH1μL1 (1− α)− ( 364μ2H2 (α+ 1) (α− 3) + μ
2
L2(α+15)(α−1)
64
+ 116μH2μL2 (α+ 3) (1− α)) and Y2 =
((1−α)((3+2α)μH1−2μL1(α+1)))
√
(μH2−μL2)(3μH2−μL2)
16 . It’s
easy to show that Y1 is convex increasing in H. Let C1 =
(
3β − 2α− 2α2 + αβ), C2 =(
α− 3β + 2α2 − αβ + 1), C3 = (2α− α2 + 3β2 − 6αβ − 2αβ2 + 4α2β) and C4 = 6α − 3α2 +
3β2 − 6αβ− 2αβ2 +4α2β− 2, then Y2 = (β−α)(HC1+LC2)
√
(H−L)(HC3−LC4)
16(1−α)2 . Since
∂3Y2
∂H3 > 0, so
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∂2Y2
∂H2 is increasing in H. limH→L
∂2
∂H2Y2 → −∞, limH→(1+ 13β )L
∂2
∂H2Y2 > 0 and limH→φ̃L
∂2
∂H2Y2
can be positive or negative. Therefore ∂
2
∂H2Y2 is either negative or first negative then pos-
itive. ∂
2
∂H2
(
ΠSR −ΠNR
)
= ∂
2
∂H2Y1 − ∂
2
∂H2Y2 is either positive or first positive then negative,
that is,
(
ΠSR −ΠNR
)
is either convex in H or first convex then concave in H. If
(
ΠSR −ΠNR
)
is convex in H, then
(
ΠSR −ΠNR
) ≤ max{limH→L (ΠSR −ΠNR ) , limH→φ̃L(ΠSR − ΠNR )} = 0. If(
ΠSR −ΠNR
)
is first convex then caocave inH, since limH→φ̃L
∂
∂H
(
ΠSR −ΠNR
)
> 0, so
(
ΠSR −ΠNR
)
≤ max{limH→L
(
ΠSR −ΠNR
)
, limH→φ̃L
(
ΠSR −ΠNR
)} = 0. So ΠSR −ΠNR < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Proof. (a) If φ ≥ φ̃, (ΠNM +ΠNR )− (ΠSM +ΠSR) = α(2−4α+α2−β2+2αβ)(α−β)2(H−L)216(1−α)3 > 0.
(b) If φ < φ̃, ∂
3
∂H3
(
ΠNM +Π
N
R
)
=
3L3(β−α)(C3−C4)2
√
(H−L)(HC3−LC4)
128(1−α)(H−L)3(HC3−LC4)3 ((C3C5 + 2C3C6 +
C4C5)H −L (C3C6 + 2C4C5 + C4C6)) < 0, where C5 = 2α−β+2α
2−3αβ
α−1 and C6 = (1− 3α+ β−
2α2 + 3αβ)/(α − 1). ∂3∂H3
(
ΠSM +Π
S
R
)
= 0, so ∂
2
∂H2
((
ΠNM +Π
N
R
)− (ΠSM +ΠSR)) is decreasing
in H, since limH→L ∂
2
∂H2 (
(
ΠNM +Π
N
R
)− (ΠSM +ΠSR)) > 0, so ∂2∂H2 ((ΠNM +ΠNR )− (ΠSM +ΠSR))
decreases from a positive value to a negative value or is positive. In other words,
(
ΠNM +Π
N
R
)−(
ΠSM +Π
S
R
)
is either first convex then concave or convex. Because limH→L ∂∂H (
(
ΠNM +Π
N
R
)−(
ΠSM +Π
S
R
)
) < 0, limH→φ̃L
∂
∂H
((
ΠNM +Π
N
R
)− (ΠSM +ΠSR)) > 0, hence ΠNM+ΠNR−(ΠSM +ΠSR)
is first decreasing then increasing in H. Since limH→L((ΠNM + Π
N
R ) − (ΠSM + ΠSR)) = 0 and
limH=φ̃L
((
ΠNM +Π
N
R
)− (ΠSM +ΠSR)) = (α−β)2α(1−α)(−4α+α2−β2+2αβ+2)L24(10α−5α2+3β2−6αβ−2αβ2+4α2β−4)2 > 0, so there must
exist a φ2 ∈
(
1, φ̃
)
such that
((
ΠNM +Π
N
R
)− (ΠSM +ΠSR)) ≤ 0 if and only if φ ≤ φ2. If φ ≤ φ2,(
ΠN −ΠS) ≤ 0, that is, ΠNR − ΠSR ≤ ΠSM − ΠNM , so the retailer can charge the manufacturer
a side payment ΠSM − ΠNM for information sharing. Now we prove limH→L ∂∂H (
(
ΠNM +Π
N
R
) −(
ΠSM +Π
S
R
)
) < 0, limH→φ̃L
∂
∂H
((
ΠNM +Π
N
R
)− (ΠSM +ΠSR)) > 0
∂
∂H
(
ΠNM +Π
N
R
)
= 116
(β−α)
(1−α)
2C5(H−L)(HC3−LC4)+(C5H+C6L)(2HC3−LC3−LC4)
2
√
(H−L)(HC3−LC4)
+ (((11α − 6α2
+3)β4+4α
(
6α2 − 11α− 3)β3+ (36α3 − 30α4 + 64α2 − 26α+ 4)β2+4α(19α− 32α2+6α3+
3α4 − 4)β + α2 (22α+ α2 − 3α3 − 12))H − L((11α− 6α2 + 3)β4 + 4α (−11α+ 6α2 − 3)β3
+
(
33α3 − 30α4 + 69α2 − 27α+ 3)β2 + (12α5 + 30α4 − 142α3 + 90α2 − 26α+ 4)β + (81α3 −
14α4 − 6α5 − 73α2 + 20α)))/(32 (α− 1)3) and ∂∂H
(
ΠSM +Π
S
R
)
= 34α(
(
2αβ − β2 − α)H +
L (1− β) (2α− β − 1))/(α − 1). limH→L ∂∂H
((
ΠNM +Π
N
R
)− (ΠSM +ΠSR)) = limH→L((1− α)
(α− β)L2/(16√(H − L) (HC3 − LC4)) + L (α− β) (−3α− β + 3α2 − 3αβ + 4) /(32(α − 1)))
= −∞ and limH=φ̃L ∂∂H (
(
ΠNM +Π
N
R
) − (ΠSM +ΠSR)) = 164L (β − α) (− (2α− 3)2 β4 + 4α(13 −
16α + 4α2)β3 +
(
90α3 − 20α4 − 30α2 − 70α+ 24)β2 + 4α (59α− 39α2 − α3 + 2α4 − 20)β +(
95α4 − 26α5 − 54α3 − 72α2 + 72α− 16))/((α− 1)2 (β (2α− 3) (2α− β)+(10α− 5α2 − 4))) >
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0.
Proof of Proposition 2.9
Proof.
ΠSIM =
1
8
(
μ2H1α+ μ
2
L1 (1− α)
)
,
ΠSIR =
1
16
(
μ2H1α+ μ
2
L1 (1− α)
)
.
ΠNIM =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
8
(
μ2H2α+ μ
2
L2 (1− α)
)
if φ ≥ φ̃,
1
8
(4q(1−PHH)+μH1(PHH+PLH))2
(PLH+1)
2 α+
1
2
(2q(1−PLH)+μH1PLH)2
(PLH+1)
2 (1− α) otherwise.
ΠNIR =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1
4
(
μH1 − 12μH2
)2
αβ + 14
(
μH1 − 12μL2
)2
α (1− β)
+
(μL1− 12μH2)
2
α(1−β)+(μL1− 12μL2)
2
(1−2α+αβ)
4
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ if φ ≥ φ̃,⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(
μH1 −WNIH −QNIHH
)
QNIHHαβ
+
(
μL1 −WNIH −QNIHL
)
QNIHLα (1− β)
+
(
μH1 −WNIL −QNILH
)
QNILHα (1− β)
+
(
μL1 −WNIL −QNILL
)
QNILL (1− 2α+ αβ)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
otherwise.
(a) We first prove that ΠNIM < Π
SI
M and Π
NI
R > Π
SI
R . If φ ≥ φ, ΠSIM −ΠNIM = (α (1− β) (1 +
β−2α) (α− β)2 (H − L)2)/(8 (1− α)3) > 0, ΠSIR −ΠNIR = − 316 α(1−β)(1+β−2α)(α−β)
2(H−L)2
(1−α)3 < 0.
ΠSIt −ΠNIt = − 116 α(1−β)(1+β−2α)(α−β)
2(H−L)2
(1−α)3 < 0.
If φ < φ, it’s easy to show WNIH ≤ 12μH2, WNIL < 12μL2. E
[
qNIt |At−2 = H
]
= (QNIHHPHH +
QNIHL (1− PHH)) ≤ 14μH2 and E
[
qNIt |At−2 = L
]
= QNILHPLH +Q
NI
LL(1− PLH) < 14μL2. ΠNIM =
WNIH E
[
qNIt |At−2 = H
]
α+WNIL E
[
qNIt |At−2 = L
]
(1− α) < 18μ2H2α+ 18μ2L2 (1− α) = ΠSIM .
E
[
πNItR |At−2 = H,At−1 = H
]
= 14
(
μH1 −WNIH
)2
> 14
(
μH1 − 12μH2
)2
since WNIH <
1
2μH2.
E
[
πNItR |At−2 = L,At−1 = H
]
Pr (At−2 = L,At−1 = H) + E[πNItR |At−2 = H,At−1 = L] Pr(At−2
= H,At−1 = L) ≥ 14
(
μH1 − 12μL2
)2
α (1− β) + 14
(
μL1 − 12μH2
)2
α (1− β). E[πNItR |At−2 = L,
At−1 = L] > 14
(
μL1 − 12μL2
)2
. Therefore ΠNIR >
1
4
(
μH1 − 12μH2
)2
αβ +
(μH1− 12μL2)
2
4 α (1− β)
+ 14
(
μL1 − 12μH2
)2
α (1− β) + 14
(
μL1 − 12μL2
)2
(1− 2α+ αβ) > 116
(
μ2H1α+ μ
2
L1 (1− α)
)
=
ΠSIR .
(b) Now we compare supply chain’s ex ante profits with information sharing scenario with
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that with no information sharing scenario. The supply chain’s ex ante profits are
ΠSIM +Π
SI
R =
3
16
(
μ2H1α+ μ
2
L1 (1− α)
)
,
ΠNIM +Π
NI
R =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
4
(
μ2H1α+ μ
2
L1 (1− α)− 14μ2H2α− 14μ2L2 (1− α)
)
if φ ≥ φ̃,(
μH1 −QNIHH
)
QNIHHαβ +
(
μL1 −QNILL
)
QNILL (1− 2α+ αβ)
+
((
μH1 −QNILH
)
QNILH + (μL1 −QNIHL)QNIHL
)
α (1− β)
if φ < φ̃.
If φ ≥ φ̃, (ΠSIM +ΠSIR ) − (ΠNIM +ΠNIR ) = 316 (μ2H1α+ μ2L1 (1− α)) − 14 (μ2H1α + μ2L1 (1− α) −
1
4μ
2
H2α − 14μ2L2 (1− α)) = − 116 α(1−β)(1+β−2α)(α−β)
2(H−L)2
(1−α)3 ≤ 0. If φ < φ̃,
(
ΠSIM +Π
SI
R
) −(
ΠNIM +Π
NI
R
)
= (β−α)
16(α−1)2((1−2α)β2+2(α+α2−1)β+(α2−6α+4))2 ((16α (α− 2)β7 − 8α(−27α + 14α2
− 1)β6 + (292α4 − 440α3 − 270α2 + 73α+ 9)β5 + (76α4 − 332α5 + 1192α3 − 309α2 − 67α)β4 +
(136α6+600α5−1560α4−178α3+462α2+4α−24)β3−2α(76α+421α2−745α3−70α4+202α5−52)
β2+
(
362α6 − 551α5 − 499α4 + 812α3 − 204α2 − 48α+ 16)β+(137α5−93α6+216α4−452α3
+256α2−48α))H2−2HL((16α2 − 32α)β7+(216α2 − 112α3 + 8α)β6+(292α4−424α3−306α2
+ 93α + 9)β5 + (1376α3 − 4α4 − 332α5 − 420α2 − 57α − 3)β4 + (136α6 + 732α5 − 1812α4 −
138α3+570α2−24α−24)β3+(116α5−472α6+1892α4−1250α3−74α2+132α−8)β2+(474α6−
751α5−607α4+1212α3−460α2+4α+16)β+(199α5−132α6+329α4−784α3+548α2−160α
+16))+L2(
(
16α2 − 32α)β7+(216α2 − 112α3 + 8α)β6+(292α4 − 408α3 − 342α2 + 113α+ 9)
β5 +
(
1560α3 − 84α4 − 332α5 − 531α2 − 47α− 6)β4 + (136α6 + 864α5 − 2052α4 − 134α3 +
714α2 − 64α − 24)β3 + (48α5 − 540α6 + 2438α4 − 1830α3 + 96α2 + 136α − 12)β2 + (618α6 −
1027α5− 699α4+1704α3− 808α2+88α+12)β+(285α5− 187α6+510α4− 1320α3+1044α2−
364α+48))). It’s easy to show that ∂∂H
(
ΠSIt −ΠNIt
)
< 0. So
(
ΠSIt −ΠNIt
)
is decreasing in H.
limH→L
((
ΠSIM +Π
SI
R
)− (ΠNIM +ΠNIR )) = L2 (β − α) (1− α) ((4− 8β)α3+(11β2 − 5β + 6)α2
+
(
5β − 3β2 − 3β3 − 11)α+(β2 − β + 4))/(4((1−2α)β2+2 (α+ α2 − 1)β+(α2 − 6α+ 4))2) >
0, and limH→φ̃L
(
ΠSIt −ΠNIt
)
= − (α− β)2 α(1 − α) (1− β) (1 + β − 2α)L2/(4(β (2α− 3) (2α
− β) + (10α− 5α2 − 4))2) ≤ 0. limH→φ̃L(ΠSIt −ΠNIt ) is equal to zero if and only if β = 1. So
there must exist a φ∞ ∈
(
1, φ̃
)
, such that
(
ΠSIt −ΠNIt
) ≥ 0 if and only if φ ≤ φ∞.
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Appendix C: Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. It is easy to verify that ΠSNs (L)−ΠSNs (C) = 116β3 8β
2+β3−16
(β+2)2(β2−2)2
(
a2 + urσ
2
)
< 0.
To show TSNs = C, it suffices to show Π
SN
s (E) < Π
SN
s (C). Take the difference, Π
SN
s (E) −
ΠSNs (C) = − β
2(β+1)
2(2−β2)(β+2)2 a
2+ 14β
K1(ur)
(2−β2)(β+2)2(1−urus)σ
2, whereK1(ur) = us(β+4)
(
β2 − 2)u2r+
(16us − 2β − 2β2 + 8βus − 4β2us − 2β3us)ur + us (β − 2) (β + 2)2. We next show K1(ur) is
negative.
Note that ddur K1(ur)|ur=0 = 2 (2− β) (β + 2)
2
us−2β (β + 1) and ddur K1(ur)|ur=1 = 2β(2us−
1)(β + 1).
If us ≤ 2β(β+1)2(2−β)(β+2)2 , thenK1(ur) is decreasing in ur for ur > 0, and K1(ur) < K1(ur = 0) =
us (β − 2) (β + 2)2 < 0.
If us ≥ 12 , then K1(ur) is increasing in ur for 0 < ur < 1, and K1(ur) < K1(ur = 1) =
2β (us − 1) (β + 1) < 0.
If 2β(β+1)
2(2−β)(β+2)2 < us <
1
2 , then K1(ur) peaks at ur =
(16us−2β−2β2+8βus−4β2us−2β3us)
2us(β+4)(2−β2) .
Furthermore, K1(ur) < K1(
(16us−2β−2β2+8βus−4β2us−2β3us)
2us(β+4)(2−β2) ) = β (β + 1) (2 (β − 2) (β + 2)
2
u2s + 2 (2− β) (β + 2)2 us − β (β + 1))/(us (β + 4)
(
β2 − 2)). Noting that 2 (β − 2) (β + 2)2 u2s
+ 2 (2− β) (β + 2)2 us − β (β + 1) is concave in us and is positive at us = 2β(β+1)2(2−β)(β+2)2 and
us =
1
2 , we have K1(ur =
(16us−2β−2β2+8βus−4β2us−2β3us)
2us(β+4)(2−β2) ) < 0 for
2β(β+1)
2(2−β)(β+2)2 < us <
1
2 .
Thus, for any us, we have K1(ur) < 0 for ur ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, ΠSNs (E) < Π
SN
s (C), and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. Take differences, ΠNSs (E) − ΠNSs (C) = β
4
8(2−β2)(β+2)2
(
a2 + usσ
2
)
> 0, and ΠNSs (L) −
ΠNSs (E) =
β2(β−2)2
8(β2−2)2 a
2 + 18 (β − 2)2
(β2u2s−2u2s+4us−2)ur−β2us
(β2−2)2(urus−1) σ
2.
If β2u2s − 2u2s + 4us − 2 ≥ 0, then
(
β2u2s − 2u2s + 4us − 2
)
ur − β2us ≤ (us − 1) (2 − 2us
+ β2us) < 0; if β
2u2s − 2u2s +4us − 2 < 0, then
(
β2u2s − 2u2s + 4us − 2
)
ur − β2us < −β2us < 0.
Hence ΠNSs (L) > Π
NS
s (E) > Π
NS
s (C), and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
We prove Proposition 3.4 by showing Lemmas A1-A6 below.
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Let mEC =
(2−2β+βvr)
8(2−β2) (2 − 2β + βvr + 2β vsus ) − 1(2+β)2 , and nEC =
(2−2β+βvr)
8(2−β2) (2 − 2β +
βvr + 2β
vs
us
)− (2−βur)2
(4−β2urus)2 . We have Π
NN
s (E)−ΠNNs (C) = mEC · a2 + nEC · usσ2.
Lemma A1. mEC > 0 iff us <
2ur+βur−2
βur
.
Proof of Lemma A1.
mEC = − 18β2 (−2β + 2ur + βur + βurus − 2) −2ur−βur+βurus+2(β2−2)(β+2)2(urus−1)2 > 0 if and only if us <
2ur+βur−2
βur
.
Lemma A2. nEC > 0 if and only if us <
2ur+βur−2
βur
.
Proof of Lemma A2.
nEC = − 18 β(β−2)(−2ur−βur+βurus+2)(β2−2)(urus−1)2(β2urus−4)2 H1 (us), whereH1 (us) = (β − 2)β
2u3ru
3
s+(β(β−2)(β+
2)ur + 2(2 − β)(β + β2 + 4))u2ru2s + 8ur(β + βur − 4)us + 8 (2− βur). As H1 (us) is cubic
function of us and
d2
du2s
H1 (us) |us=0 = 2u2r (β − 2)
(−2β − 2β2 + 2βur + β2ur − 8) > 0 and
d2
du2s
H1 (us) |us=1 = 4u2r (β − 2) (−β − β2 + βur + 2β2ur − 4) > 0, we have H1 (us) is convex
in us on us ∈ (0, 1). Noting ddusH1 (us) |us=1 = ur(β (5β + 4) (β − 2)u2r + 4
(
8 + β2 − β3)ur +
8 (β − 4)) which can easily be shown negative for any ur ∈ (0, 1). Thus,H1 (us) > H1 (us = 1) =
2(ur − 1)(8 (ur − 1) + βu2r (β + 1) (β − 2)) > 0.
Therefore, nEC > 0 if and only if us <
2ur+βur−2
βur
.
By Lemmas A1 and A2, ΠNNs (E) > Π
NN
s (C) if and only if us <
2ur+βur−2
βur
.
For us <
2ur+βur−2
βur
, we compare ΠNNs (E) and Π
NN
s (L).
Let mEL =
(2−2β+βvr)
8(2−β2) (2−2β+βvr+2β vsus )−
(4−2β−β2vs)2
16(2−β2)2 , and nEL =
(2−2β+βvr)
8(2−β2) (2−2β+
βvr+2β
vs
us
)us−( (4−2β−β
2vs)
2
16(2−β2)2 ur+
vr+vs−ur
4 ). We have Π
NN
s (E)−ΠNNs (L) = mEL ·a2+nEL ·σ2.
Lemma A3. mEL < 0.
Proof of Lemma A3.
mEL = − 116β2 K2(ur)(β2−2)2(urus−1)2 , where K2 (ur) = ((3β − 4)βu
2
s + 4 − 2β2)u2r − 2((β2 + 2β
− 4)u2s + 2 (β − 1) (β − 2)us + 2
(
2− β2))ur + β2u2s + 4 (β − 2)us + 4 (3− 2β).
As (3β − 4)βu2s + 4− 2β2 > 0, K2 (ur) is convex in ur. Noting ddur K2 (ur) |ur=1 = 4us(β −
1)(β−2)(us−1) < 0, K2 (ur) is decreasing in ur for ur ∈ (0, 1). Hence K2 (ur) > K2 (ur = 1) =
2(us − 1)2(β − 2)2 > 0 and mEL < 0.
Lemma A4. nEL < 0 for us <
2ur+βur−2
βur
.
Proof of Lemma A4.
nEL =
1
16 (β − 2) K3(ur)(β2−2)2(urus−1)2 , where K3 (ur) = 2u
3
r (2− β) (1− us)2
(
usβ
2 + 2− 2us
)
+ 2u2r (1− ur) (1− us) (2β2u2s (1− β) + us (1− us)
(
4− 2β + 4β2 − 3β3) + 4 (1− us)2 (2 − β)
+ur (1− ur)2 (β2u2s(2−β)+4βus(1−us)(−2β2+β+2)+4(2−β)(1−us)2)+4(1−ur)3βus(2−β2).
Clearly, K3 (ur) > 0 as each term of it is positive, and this completes the proof.
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By Lemmas A3 and A4, we have ΠNNs (E) < Π
NN
s (L) for us <
2ur+βur−2
βur
. That is, for
us <
2ur+βur−2
βur
, the strategic firm always produces after the routine firm.
For us ≥ 2ur+βur−2βur , we compare ΠNNs (C) and ΠNNs (L).
Let mCL =
1
(2+β)2
− (4−2β−β
2vs)
2
16(2−β2)2 , and nCL =
(2−βur)2us
(4−β2urus)2 −
(
(4−2β−β2vs)2ur
16(2−β2)2 +
vr+vs−ur
4
)
.
We have ΠNNs (C)−ΠNNs (L) = mCL · a2 + nCL · σ2.
Lemma A5. mCL < 0 if and only if us <
2
2+β−βur .
Proof of Lemma A5.
mCL = − 116β2 −2us−βus+βurus+2(β+2)2(β2−2)2(urus−1)2K4 (ur) where K4 (ur) = (8β
2 + β3 − 16)usur + 16 −
2β2us−β3us−6β2. As K4 (ur) is decreasing in ur and K4 (ur = 1) = 2
(
3β2 − 8) (us − 1) > 0,
we haveK4 (ur) > 0. ThusmCL < 0 if and only if −2us−βus+βurus+2 > 0 i.e., us < 22+β−βur .
Lemma A6. There exists a threshold ûs ( ûs >
2
2+β−βur ) such that nCL > 0 if and only if
2
2+β−βur < us < min[ûs, 1].
Proof of Lemma A6.
nCL =
(2−βur)2us
(4−β2urus)2 −
(
(2β+β2vs−4)2ur
16(β2−2)2 +
v2s
4us
− v2sur4
)
= ur(β−2)(2−2us−βus+βurus)H2(us)
16(β2−2)2(urus−1)2(β2urus−4)2 ,
where H2 (us) = β
4u2r
(
4− 3β2 + (2β + 3β2 − 8)ur)u3s +(−2β(2β+ β2 +4)(−8β+ β2 +2β3 +
4)ur+4(−20β2+6β4+β6+16))uru2s+(8(8β−6β2−2β3+2β4+β5−8)ur−16
(−5β2 + 2β4 + 4))
us + 32 (2− β).
We can show that H2 (us) is decreasing in us for us ∈ (0, 1).
Note that H2(us =
2
2+β−βur ) = −
32β2(β+2)(β2−2)(ur−1)(βur−2)(−β+ur+βur−2)
(−β+βur−2)3 > 0.
If us ≤ 22+β−βur , then nCL < 0.
If us >
2
2+β−βur , let β̂ be the unique root of −5β+2β3+2 in the interval (0, 1) (β̂ ≈ 0.43232).
Consider two cases, β ≤ β̂ (i.e., −5β + 2β3 + 2 ≥ 0) and β > β̂, (i.e., −5β + 2β3 + 2 < 0):
(i) if β ≤ β̂, then H2 (us = 1) < 0 if and only if ur < ûr = (2 (β + 2)
(−8β + 2β2 + β4 + 4) −
2
(
2− β2)√−48β + 36β2 − 12β4 + 4β5 + β6 + 16)/(β3 (β + 2) (3β − 4)), and in this case, there
exists a threshold 22+β−βur < ûs < 1 such that H2 (us) > 0 (and hence nCL > 0) if and only
if us < ûs; (ii) if β > β̂, then H2 (us = 1) > 0 for ur ∈ (0, 1) , and in this case, H2 (us) for all
us ∈
(
2
2+β−βur , 1
)
and hence nCL > 0.
Therefore, if β > β̂, then nCL > 0 if and only if us >
2
2+β−βur ; if β ≤ β̂, then nCL > 0 if and
only if 22+β−βur < us < ûs, with ûs < 1 if and only if ur < ûr = (2 (β + 2)
(−8β + 2β2 + β4 + 4)−
2
(
2− β2)√−48β + 36β2 − 12β4 + 4β5 + β6 + 16)/(β3 (β + 2) (3β − 4)).
By Lemmas A5 and A6, if us ≤ 22+β−βur , then mCL ≤ 0 and nCL ≤ 0, and hence
ΠNNs (C) ≤ ΠNNs (L). If 22+β−βur < us < min[ûs, 1], then mCL > 0 and nCL > 0, and hence
ΠNNs (C) > Π
NN
s (L). If us ≥ min[ûs, 1], then mCL > 0 and nCL ≤ 0, and hence ΠNNsC > ΠNNsL
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if and only if σ
2
a2 < −mCLnCL .
Now we prove Proposition 4. If us ≤ 22+β−βur , then ΠNNs (C) < ΠNNs (L), and thus TNNs =
L.
If us >
2
2+β−βur , we discuss two cases, β ≤ β̂ and β > β̂. For β > β̂, we have mCL > 0 and
nCL > 0; let δ be the upper bound of
σ2
a2 (denoted by U), and clearly Π
NN
s (C) > Π
NN
s (L) for
all us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 < δ. For β ≤ β̂, mCL > 0 always holds but nCL > 0 if and only if
us ≤ ûs; let δ =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ min[−
mCL
nCL
, U ] for us > ûs
U for 22+β−βur < us ≤ ûs
, and clearly ΠNNs (C) > Π
NN
s (L)
for σ
2
a2 < δ. Thus Proposition 4 is proved by combining Lemmas A1-A6.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. (i) Recall that TSSs = E, T
NS
s = L, q
SS
r (E) =
4−2β−β2
4(2−β2) (a+ vrYr + vsYs) and q
NS
r (L) =
1−β
2−β2 (a+ vrYr + vsYs). Take the difference between the two quantities and the result follows.
(ii) Recall that TSNs = T
NN
s = C if us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 < δ. Recall also that
qSNr (C) =
1
2+β (a+ urYr) and q
NN
r (C) =
1
2+βa +
2−βus
4−β2urusurYr. Take difference between
the two quantities, and it is easy to show that E[qSNr (C)] = E[q
NN
r (C)], and q
SN
r (C) responds
more strongly to Yr than q
NN
r (C) does for us >
2
2+β−βur .
Recall that TSNs = C and T
NN
s = L if us <
2
2+β−βur or
σ2
a2 > δ. Recall also that q
SN
r (C) =
1
2+β (a+ urYr) and q
NN
r (L) =
1
2(2−β2) (2− 2β + βvs) · (a+ urYr). We discuss the two cases:
us <
2
2+β−βur and us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 > δ. For us <
2
2+β−βur , take difference between
qSNr (C) and q
NN
r (L), and it is easy to show that E[q
SN
r (C)] > E[q
NN
r (L)] and q
SN
r (C) responds
more strongly to Yr than q
NN
r (L) does. For us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 > δ, take difference between
qSNr (C) and q
NN
r (L), and it is easy to show that E[q
SN
r (C)] < E[q
NN
r (L)] and q
SN
r (C) responds
less strongly to Yr than q
NN
r (L) does.
Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proof. (i) Recall that TSSs = E and T
NS
s = L. When firm s shares his information, firm r’s
value of sharing her information is Wr(S) = Π
SS
r (E) − ΠNSr (L) = (
4−2β−β2)2(a2+(vr+vs)σ2)
16(2−β2)2
− 1−β2(2−β2)a2 − 1−β2(2−β2)
(
v2s
1
us
+ 2vsvr + v
2
r
1
ur
)
σ2 = 116β
2 (β−2)2
(β2−2)2 a
2 + β
2(β−2)2
16
ur+us−2urus
(β2−2)2(1−urus)σ
2,
which is positive.
(ii) Recall that TSNs = C, and T
NN
s = C if us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 < δ and T
NN
s = L other-
wise. When firm s does not share his information, if us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 < δ , then firm r’s
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value of sharing her information is Wr(N) = Π
SN
r (C) − ΠNNr (C) = 1(2+β)2
(
a2 + urσ
2
) −
1
(2+β)2
a2 − (2−βus)2
(4−β2usur)2urσ
2 =
(−2β+2βus+β2us+β2urus−8)(−2us−βus+βurus+2)
(β+2)2(β2urus−4)2 βurσ
2, which is
positive; if us ≤ 22+β−βur or σ
2
a2 > δ, Wr(N) = Π
SN
r (C) − ΠNNr (L) = 1(2+β)2
(
a2 + urσ
2
) −
(2−2β+βvs)
8(2−β2) (2 − 2β + βvs + 2β vrur ) · (a2 + urσ2) =
β2(2+2β−2us−βus−βurus)(2−2us−βus+βurus)
8(2−β2)(β+2)2(urus−1)2 (a
2
+ urσ
2), which is positive if and only if us ≤ 22+β−βur . Therefore, Wr(N) < 0 if and only
if us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 > δ. (Memo: when δ is the upper bound of
σ2
a2 , U , we always have
Wr(N) > 0 for us ≤ 22+β−βur .)
Proof of Lemma 3.4
Proof. (i) Recall that TSSs = E, T
SN
s = C, q
SS
s (E) =
2−β
2(2−β2) (a+ vrYr + vsYs) and q
SN
s (C) =
1
2+βa +
1
2vsYs +
1
2
(
vr − β2+βur
)
Yr. Take the difference between the two quantities, and it
is easy to show that E[qSSs (E)] > E[q
SN
s (C)], and q
SS
s (E) responds less strongly to Ys than
qSNs (C) does.
(ii) Recall that TNSs = L and T
NN
s = C if us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 < δ. Recall also
that qNSs (L) =
2−β
2(2−β2) (a+ vrYr + vsYs) and q
NN
s (C) =
1
2+βa+
2−βur
4−β2usur usYs. Take difference
between the two quantities, and it is easy to show that E[qNSs (L)] > E[q
NN
s (C)]. By comparing
the coefficients of Ys in q
NS
s (L) and q
NN
s (C), q
NS
s (L) responds less strongly to Ys than q
NN
s (C)
does if and only if us <
2ur(−4β+β3+4)+4β(1−β)
ur(β(2β+β2−4)ur−6β2+β3+8) .
Recall that TNSs = L and T
NN
s = L if us <
2
2+β−βur or
σ2
a2 > δ. Recall also that q
NS
s (L) =
(2−β)(a+vrYr+vsYs)
2(2−β2) and q
NN
s (L) =
(2(2−β)−β2vs)a
4(2−β2) +
vsYs
2 +
(2−β)(2−2vs−βvs)urYr
4(2−β2) . Take difference
between the two quantities, and it is easy to show that E[qNSs (L)] > E[q
NN
s (L)] and q
NS
s (L)
responds less strongly to Ys than q
NN
s (L) does.
Proof of Proposition 3.6
Proof. (i) Recall that TSSs = E and T
SN
s = C. When firm r shares her information, firm
s’s value of sharing his information is Ws (S) = Π
SS
s (E) − ΠSNs (C) = β
4
8(2−β2)(β+2)2 a
2 +
(−2(β+4)(2−β2)u2r+(4−3β)(β+2)2(2ur−1))us+β3ur
8(β2−2)(β+2)2(urus−1) βσ
2, which is positive if and only if us < û
S
s
or σ
2
a2 < η
S
s (ur, us, β), where û
S
s =
β3ur
2(β+4)(2−β2)u2r−(4−3β)(β+2)2(2ur−1)
and ηSs (ur, us, β) =
β3(urus−1)
(−2(β+4)(2−β2)u2r+(4−3β)(β+2)2(2ur−1))us+β3ur
.
(ii) Recall that TNSs = L, and T
NN
s = C if us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 < δ and T
NN
s = L
otherwise. We discuss the two possibilities TNNs = C and T
NN
s = L separately.
Case 1. us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 < δ.
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When firm r does not share her information, firm s’s value of sharing his information is
Ws(N) = Π
NS
s (L)−ΠNNs (C) = (2−β)
2
4(2−β2)2
(
a2 + (vr + vs)σ
2
)−( 1
(2+β)2
a2 + (2−βur)
2
(4−β2urus)2usσ
2
)
=
1
4β
2 8−3β2
(β+2)2(β2−2)2 a
2+
(
(2−β)2
4(2−β2)2 (vr + vs)−
(2−βur)2
(4−β2urus)2us
)
σ2. It is easy to show that (2−β)
2(vr+vs)
4(2−β2)2
−(2−βur)2us
(4−β2urus)2 > 0 if and only if us < û
N1
s , where (i) û
N1
s =
2
2+β−βur for ur < −
2(1−β)(β+2)(β+β2−4)
(2β4+β3−10β2−4β+16) ,
(ii) 22+β−βur < û
N1
s < 1 for −
2(1−β)(β+2)(β+β2−4)
(2β4+β3−10β2−4β+16) < ur <
4(1−β)
4−2β−β2 , and (iii) û
N1
s = 1 for ur >
4(1−β)
4−2β−β2 . Thus, for us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 < δ(ur, us, β), Ws(N) > 0 if and only if us < û
N1
s ,
or us ≥ ûN1s and σ
2
a2 < η
N1
s (ur, us, β), where η
N1
s (ur, us, β) =
1
4β
2 8−3β2
(β+2)2(β2−2)2
−
(
(2−β)2
4(2−β2)2
(vr+vs)− (2−βur)2
(4−β2urus)2
us
) .
Case 2. us ≤ 22+β−βur or σ
2
a2 ≥ δ.
When firm r does not share her information, firm s’s value of sharing his information is
Ws(N) = Π
NS
s (L)−ΠNNs (L) = 116β2us(1−ur)
((β2+4β−8)ur−β2)us+4(2−β)
(β2−2)2(urus−1)2 a
2+( (2−β)
2
4(2−β2)2 (vr + vs)
− (4−2β−β
2vs)
2
16(2−β2)2 ur − 14 (vr + vs − ur))σ2. It is easy to verify that the coefficient of a2 term
is positive. We can show that (2−β)
2
4(2−β2)2 (vr + vs) −
(4−2β−β2vs)2
16(2−β2)2 ur − 14 (vr + vs − ur) > 0 if
and only if us < û
N2
s , where (i) û
N2
s = 0 for ur <
4(β−1)(β+β2−4)
4(−3β−β2+β3+4) , (ii) 0 < û
N2
s < 1 for
4(β−1)(β+β2−4)
4(−3β−β2+β3+4) < ur <
4(1−β)(4−β−β2)
(β−2)(β+2)(3β−4) , and (iii) û
N2
s = 1 for ur >
4(1−β)(4−β−β2)
(β−2)(β+2)(3β−4) . Thus,
for us ≤ 22+β−βur or σ
2
a2 ≥ δ(ur, us, β), Ws(N) > 0 if and only if us < ûN2s , or us ≥ ûN2s and
σ2
a2 < η
N2
s (ur, us, β), where η
N2
s (ur, us, β) =
1
16β
2us(1−ur) ((
β2+4β−8)ur−β2)us+4(2−β)
(β2−2)2(urus−1)2
−
(
(2−β)2
4(2−β2)2
(vr+vs)− (4−2β−β
2vs)2
16(2−β2)2
ur− 14 (vr+vs−ur)
) .
It can be verified that ηN1s (ur,
2
2+β−βur , β) = η
N2
s (ur,
2
2+β−βur , β). If us >
2
2+β−βur and
σ2
a2 < δ(ur, us, β), define û
N
s = û
N1
s and η
N
s (ur, us, β) = η
N1
s (ur, us, β), and if otherwise, define
ûNs = û
N2
s and η
N
s (ur, us, β) = η
N2
s (ur, us, β).
Proof of Proposition 3.7
Proof. The equilibrium results follow immediately from Propositions 3.5 and 3.6. It remains
to show ηSs < δ. When δ = U (i.e., us < ûs with ûs defined in the proof of Lemma A6
and ûs >
2
2+β−βur ), η
S
s < δ clearly holds. Thus, we only need to focus on δ < U (hence
δ = −mCLnCL by its definition in the proof of Proposition 3.4). By the proof of Lemma A6,
we note that −mCLnCL > 0 if and only if H2 (us) < 0. Recall that H2 (us) < 0 holds only for
us > ûs >
2
2+β−βur and hence it suffices to consider the segment of us
(
2
2+β−βur , 1
)
.
We show ηSs < −mCLnCL by two steps. First, we show if −mCLnCL > 0, then ηN1s (ur, us, β) <
−mCLnCL . It can be also shown that ηN1s (ur, us, β) > 0 if and only if H3(us) > 0, where H3(us) =
β4u2r(β−2)2(2ur−1)u3s−(β2(−12β2−4β3+5β4+16)u2r−16β(β−1)(β3−4)ur+8(−12β2+4β3+
β4+8))uru
2
s+4(β
2(−8β−2β2+β4+12)u2r−4(12β−2β2−4β3+β5−8)ur+4β(β−1)(β+β2−4))
us − 16ur (β − 2)2
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H3(us) can be shown concave in us and positive at us =
2
2+β−βur and us = 1 for ur <
4(β−1)(β+β2−4)
4(−3β−β2+β3+4) < ûr.
Take the difference, ηN1s (ur, us, β) − δ =
β2us(ur−1)(β2urus−4)2·H4(us)
ur(β−2)(β+2)2·H3(us)·H2(us) , where H4 (us) =
(β4(β − 2)(β + 2)(3β − 4)(3β2 − 8)u2r − 2β4(5β2 + β3 − 8)(β − 2)2ur + β6(β + 2)(β − 2)2)u2r
u3s + (−2β(−384β − 32β2 + 64β3 + 48β4 + 84β5 − 48β6 − 21β7 + 8β8 + 256)u2r − 2(960β2 −
192β3 − 352β4 + 32β5 + 4β6 + 20β7 + 5β8 − 512)ur + 8β2(β + 2)(−12β2 + 4β3 + β4 + 8))
uru
2
s + (8(256β − 112β2 − 128β3 + 80β4 + 22β5 + 2β6 − 6β7 − 4β8 + β9 − 128)u2r + 16(−64β +
184β2 + 8β3 − 82β4 + 2β5 + 5β6 + 2β7 + β8 − 64)ur − 16β3(β − 1)(β + 2)(β + β2 − 4))
us + 32(−48β + 8β2 + 28β3 − 15β4 − 4β5 + 3β6 + 32)ur − 32β(β − 1)(β + β2 − 4)(3β2 − 8).
It is complicated but fortunately not difficult to show H4 (us) > 0 for us >
2
2+β−βur . Thus,
ηN1s (ur, us, β) < δ = −mCLnCL .
Second, we show if −mCLnCL > 0, then ηSs (ur, us, β) < ηN1s (ur, us, β).
ηSs (ur, us, β) is positive if and only if (−2 (β + 4)
(
2− β2)u2r + (4− 3β) (β + 2)2 (2ur −
1))us + β
3ur < 0. Take difference, η
S
s (ur, us, β) − ηN1s (ur, us, β) = (β2)/(2
(
2− β2) (β + 2)2
(β2urus − 4)2((−2 (β + 4)
(
2− β2)u2r + (4− 3β) (β + 2)2 (2ur − 1))us + β3ur))H5 (us) /((2 −
β)2 (vr + vs) /(4
(
2− β2)2)− (2−βur)2
(4−β2urus)2us), where H5 (us) = ((β + 4)
(
3β2 − 8)u2r+2 (8− 5β)
(β + 2)
2
ur + (5β − 8) (β + 2)2)β4u2ru3s + 4βur(48β + 28β2 − 16β3 − 8β4 + 12β2u2r − 28β3u2r −
6β4u2r +2β
5u2r +β
6u2r −112βur+64βu2r −32β2ur+44β3ur+12β4ur−2β5ur−16)u2s−2(64β−
512ur − 128β2 − 32β3 + 16β4 + 4β5 + 256u2r − 96β2u2r − 48β3u2r − 8β4u2r + 10β5u2r + 4β6u2r +
β7u2r−192βur+64βu2r+224β2ur+112β3ur−8β4ur−16β5ur−4β6ur+256)us+32βur(β2−2)
is a cubic function of us. By algebraic calculations, tedious though, we can show H5 (us) < 0
for us ∈
(
2
2+β−βur , 1
)
. Thus, ηSs (ur, us, β) < η
N1
s (ur, us, β) = η
N
s for us ∈
(
2
2+β−βur , 1
)
.
Proof of Proposition 3.8
Proof. We show ûSs and η
S
s (ur, us, β) are increasing in β.
Take the derivative ddβ û
S
s =
8β2ur(1−ur)2(2+β)(3−β)
(2(4+β)(2−β2)u2r+(4−3β)(2+β)2(1−2ur))
2 > 0.
Take the derivative ddβ η
S
s (ur, us, β) =
8β2us(1−urus)(1−ur)2(2+β)(3−β)
(β3ur−(2(4+β)(2−β2)u2r+(4−3β)(2+β)2(1−2ur))us)
2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.9
Proof. According to [?], the total surplus is
U(qs, qr) = (a+ θ)(qs + qr)− 1
2
(q2s + 2βqsqr + q
2
r),
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and the consumer Surplus (CS) is
CS = U(qs, qr)−Π,
where Π = Πs + Πr, the total profit of the two firms. Hence, the expected total surplus and
the expected consumer surplus are
E [U ] = E
[
(a+ E [θ|Ys, Yr])(qs + qr)− 1
2
(q2s + 2βqsqr + q
2
r)
]
,
E [CS] = E [U ]− E [Π] .
Substituting firms’ sale quantities into the above equations, we get
E
[
USS
]
=
96− 64β − 48β2 + 28β3 + 3β4
32(2− β2)2 (a
2 + (vs + vr)σ
2),
E
[
USN
]
=
3 + β
(2 + β)2
a2 +A1σ
2,
E
[
UNS
]
=
24− 20β − 9β2 + 8β3
8(2− β2)2 (a
2 + (vs + vr)σ
2),
E
[
UNN
]
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
β+3
(2+β)2 a
2 +A2σ
2, if us >
2
2+β−βur&
σ2
a2 < δ(ur, us, β),
A3a
2 +A4σ
2, otherwise,
CSSS =
32− 32β2 + 4β3 + 5β4
32(2− β2)2 (a
2 + (vr + vs)σ
2),
CSSN =
1 + β
(2 + β)2
a2 +A5σ
2,
CSNS =
8− 4β − 7β2 + 4β3
8(2− β2)2 (a
2 + (vs + vr)σ
2),
CSNN =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1+β
(2+β)2 a
2 +A6σ
2, if us >
2
2+β−βur &
σ2
a2 < δ(ur, us, β),
A7a
2 +A8σ
2, otherwise,
where A1 = (3us(2+β)
2−us(12−4β−3β2)u2r+(8(β+3)−6(β+2)2us)ur)/(8(2+β)2(1−urus)),
A2 = (12ur + (12− β2u2r − 16βur)us − β2ur(1− 2βur)u2s)/(2(4− β2urus)2),
A3 = (−β2(4− 3β2)v2s + 4(4β − 2β2 − β3)vs + 4(24− 20β − 9β2 + 8β3))/(32(2− β2)2),
A4 = (4vr(24−20β−9β2+8β3)− (12(2−β2)2+β2(4−3β2)vr)v2s − ((48−16β−40β2+4β3
+ 12β4)vr − 12(2− β2)2)vs)/(32(1− vs)(2− β2)2),
A5 = (us(2 + β)
2 − us(4 + 4β − β2)u2r + (8(1 + β)− 2us(2 + β)2)ur)/(8(2 + β)2(1− urus)),
A6 = (4ur + (4− 3β2u2r)us − β2ur(3− 2βur)u2s)/(2(4− β2urus)2),
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A7 = (β
2(4− 3β2)v2s + 4β(4− 2β − 3β2 + 2β3)vs + 4(8− 4β − 7β2 + 4β3))/(32(2− β2)2),
A8 = (4vr(8 − 4β − 7β2 + 4β3) − (4(1 − β)(4 − 2β2 + β3)vr − 4(2 − β2)2)vs − (4(2 − β2)2
− β2vr(4− 3β2))v2s)/(32(1− vs)(2− β2)2).
E
[
USS
]−E [USN ] = β2(32−16β−20β2+8β3+3β4)32(2+β)2(2−β2)2 a2+( (96−64β−48β2+28β3+3β4)(vs+vr)32(2−β2)2 −A1)σ2 >
(β
2(32−16β−20β2+8β3+3β4)
32(2+β)2(2−β2)2 +
96−64β−48β2+28β3+3β4
32(2−β2)2 (vs+vr)−A1)σ2 since σ is small relative to a.
Thus, E
[
USS
]−E [USN ] > σ2(4(12− 4β − 3β2)(2− β2)2usu2r + (β2(32− 16β − 20β2 +8β3 +
3β4)− (384−128β−384β2+80β3+132β4−8β5−15β6)us)ur+((2−β)(24−20β−10β2+9β3)
(2+β)2us+β
2(32−16β−20β2+8β3+3β4))/(32(2+β)2(2−β2)2(1−urus))). The denominator
is greater than 0 and let K5(ur) be the molecular. If us <
β2(32−16β−20β2+8β3+3β4)
384−128β−384β2+80β3+132β4−8β5−15β6 ,
d
dur
K5(ur) > 0, so K5(ur) ≥ K5(0) > 0. If us > 13 , ddur K5(ur) < 0, so , K5(ur) > K5(1) ≥ 0. If
β2(32−16β−20β2+8β3+3β4)
384−128β−384β2+80β3+132β4−8β5−15β6 ≤ us ≤ 13 , let ũr = ((384−128β−384β2+80β3+132β4−8β5
− 15β6)us − β2(32 − 16β − 20β2 + 8β3 + 3β4))/(2(4(12 − 4β − 3β2)(β2 − 2)2us)), K5(ur) is
minimized at ũr. Thus, K5(ur) ≥ K5(ũr) = β2(32 − 16β − 20β2 + 8β3 + 3β4)((20β4 − 8β5 −
3β6 + 16β3 − 32β2) − (1536 − 512β − 1632β2 + 368β3 + 588β4 − 56β5 − 69β6)u2s + (1536 −
512β − 1728β2 + 416β3 + 648β4 − 80β5 − 78β6)us)/(16us(12 − 4β − 3β2)(2 − β2)2). The
denominator of K5(ũr) is greater than 0 and the molecular of K5(ũr) is concave in us. Since
when us =
{
β2(32−16β−20β2+8β3+3β4)
384−128β−384β2+80β3+132β4−8β5−15β6 ,
1
3
}
, the molecular of K5(ũr) is no less than
0, so K5(ũr) ≥ 0. Therefore, E
[
USS
] ≥ E [USN ].
Similarly, one can show that E
[
USS
] ≥ E [UNS], E [USS] ≥ E [UNN ], E [CSSS] ≥
E
[
CSSN
]
, E
[
CSSS
] ≥ E [CSNS], E [CSSS] ≥ E [CSNN ].
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